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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1978 case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,' the United
States Supreme Court first recognized the Federal Communications
Commission's (FCC) authority to regulate the broadcast of indecent
subject matter. The FCC narrowly interpreted this authority during
the nine years that followed, limiting its indecency prohibition to
seven "dirty" words.2 The seven proscribed words, although worthy
1. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
2. Id. In 1973, a New York radio station, a licensee of Pacifica Foundation, Inc.,
broadcast George Carlin's twelve-minute-long satiric routine called "Filthy Words." Id. at
729. In the routine, Carlin joked about the seven "dirty" words that cannot be broadcast. Id.
The seven words are "fuck," "shit," "cunt," "piss," "motherfucker," "tit," and "cocksucker."
Id. at 751. For a detailed discussion of Pacifica, see supra notes 98-137 and accompanying
text.
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of first amendment protection if printed or spoken in public, could not
be aired in a repetitive manner when there was a reasonable risk that
children were in the broadcast audience.3 Broadcasters, although
indignant over their second-class status as first amendment players,
were relieved at the FCC's narrow reading of its indecency authority.4
A radical change occurred in April 1987, however, when the
FCC abruptly adopted a broad generic indecency standard.5 In July
1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld this standard in Action For Children's Television v. FCC.6 A
broadcast becomes indecent under this standard if it is "language or
material that depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as mea-
sured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs."7 As defined by the
FCC, indecency is a broad and vague category of activities. Its
parameters lie somewhere between the images of a passionate embrace
and a hardcore sexual encounter, and between dialogue with hints of
sex and a profane account of sexual activities. Thus, indecency is a
mysterious class of material that requires circularity in its definition:
3. Id. at 750. The Supreme Court did not precisely articulate the first amendment rights
of broadcasters in Pacifica, but did state that the FCC properly can prohibit the broadcasting
of the seven "dirty" words at a time of day when children are likely to be in the audience. Id.
In a footnote, however, the Court stated that it was not considering whether playing the Carlin
monologue at night would be permissible since broadcast audiences at that time contain so few
children. Id. at 750 n.28; see also Note, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 95
(1979).
4. See Hsiung, Indecent Broadcast: An Assessment of Pacifica's Impact, 9 COMM. & L.
41, 43 (1987) (Pacifica at first raised great fear in broadcasters, which were proved false by the
FCC's subsequent action).
5. 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1218 (April 29, 1987). On April 16, 1987, the FCC cited
three separate stations for broadcasting indecent material and later issued a Public Notice
summarizing the Commission's actions and stating that a new standard would be applied to
the regulation of indecency. Id. at 1218-19. The FCC stated that the generic standard came
from its 1975 Pacifica decision [Pacifica Foundation-WBAI, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975)]. In re
Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 211, 214 (Dec. 29,
1987). The 1987 indecency standard language, in fact, was slightly expanded from the 1975
standard. See, e.g., Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (The early standard was limited to
descriptive language and not the more general category of "depictions" of "material."). For a
more indepth discussion of the FCC's actions after Pacifica see infra section III.
6. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
7. Id. at 1335. The FCC observed that, under the prior standard,
material that portrayed sexual or excretory activities or organs in as patently
offensive a manner as the earlier Carlin monologue-and, consequently, of
concern with respect to its exposure to children-would have been permissible to
broadcast simply because it avoided certain words. That approach, in essence,
ignored an entire category of speech by focusing exclusively on specific words
rather than the generic definition of indecency. This made neither legal nor
policy sense.
In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 211, 214 (Dec. 29,
1987).
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Something is indecent if it is patently offensive, and it is patently
offensive if it is indecent. Ironically, the FCC's more intrusive regula-
tory approach comes during a period when the Commission is making
significant strides in deregulating the broadcast industry and sug-
gesting that broadcast content should get heightened first amendment
protection.8 But it also comes at a time when explicit sexual accounts
and depictions are the norm instead of the exception on radio and
television.9 Broadcasters increasingly are finding that sex attracts
larger audiences, despite FCC claims that it receives approximately
20,000 indecency complaints annually.' 0
In Action, the D.C. Circuit unflinchingly accepted the FCC's
argument that limiting the Commission's authority to the regulation
of a particular list of indecent words would have an anomalous effect
on the prohibition of indecent broadcasts." The FCC asserted that
the word-list method of enforcement, while offering a bright-line rule
for broadcasters, was underinclusiveness because of its failure to regu-
late double entendre and sexual innuendo.' 2 This assertion resur-
rected the debate concerning the FCC's authority and role in
regulating the moral content of broadcasts.' 3 Furthermore, the D.C.
8. Geller, The FCC Under Mark Fowler: A Mixed Bag, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 521 (Winter 1988) (Fowler brought and carried through a philosophy of deregulation.);
Fowler, The Federal Communications Commission 1981-87: What the Chairman Said, 10
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 409, 455 (Winter 1988) (Supervision of children's viewing
habits should be left to parents so that government control can be relaxed.).
9. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood tracks sex on TV, BROADCASTING, Feb. 15, 1988, at 121
(The Planned Parenthood Federation of America released a study estimating there were
65,000 episodes of sexual behavior or references to it during the prime time programming on
the three major broadcast television networks during the 1987-88 season.).
10. See e.g., Where Are the Censors? A titillating fall raises questions about network
standards, TIME, Dec. 12, 1988, at 95 (During the recent wave of cost cutting, the ranks of
network departments of standards and practices-the censors reviewing what is broadcast-
has been reduced from a peak of seventy-five to eighty per network during the 1970s to thirty
to forty presently.); Indecency: Radio's sound, FCC'sfury, BROADCASTING, June 22, 1987, at
46-49 (The 20,000 complaints, according to FCC staff, involve mostly television and the sex it
presents.). Two months after the FCC's 1987 crackdown on indecency, during one month it
received 272 letters regarding obscenity, indecency and profanity involving AM and FM
stations and a category headed AS (all services). Id. at 46. Television and cable complaints
totalled 357 for the same month. Id.
11. Action For Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
12. Id.
13. Broadcasters sanctioned by the FCC argued that the broadened FCC standard was
unconstitutionally vague and reached far beyond the class of material that the FCC could
define as indecent. Petitioner's Brief at 19, Action. Furthermore, they asserted that the
standard chills fully protected material, including material that has serious literary, artistic,
political, and scientific merit, such as news and informational programming. Id. Because
broadcasters risk loss of license for failure to comply with the standard, the chilling effect has
great consequences. The broadcasters argued that the new standard gave the FCC virtually
unlimited discretion to define proscribed program material, thus reopening the question of
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Circuit failed to account for Pacifica, the precedent it ostensibly relied
upon. Pacifica was not a clear-cut case, yielding a definitive answer
on the broad category of indecency. This is evidenced by the lack of a
majority in any section of the Court's opinion.14 The Supreme
Court's concern that speech protected under the first amendment
would be chilled apparently was not considered in enacting the FCC's
new standard.
The FCC has analogized indecent speech to nuisances, which
should be directed away from those who may be injured by them.15
In effect, indecent material is taboo only when foisted upon the wrong
audience, namely children.' 6 Therefore, until recently, when Congress
required a total indecency ban, 7 the FCC sought to channel indecent
material to those hours when children were not likely audience mem-
bers.18 Obscene material, by comparison, has a prurient appeal to its
whether the FCC has become a censor in this area. Id. Broadcasters also contended the FCC
offered no justification for the new standard, thereby making it arbitrary and capricious, as
well as, unconstitutional. Id. at 32-36.
14. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. The Pacifica opinion had no majority, with a maximum of
three justices agreeing on any section of the opinion. Id. Justice Powell, joined by Justice
Blackmun, wrote a concurrence. Id. at 755. Dissents were filed by Justice Brennan, who was
joined by Justice Marshall, and by Justice Stewart, who was joined by Justices Brennan, White,
and Marshall. Id. at 762, 777.
15. The FCC has characterized the repetitious use of profanity as "patently offensive,"
although not obscene, and has found that such speech should be regulated by principles
analogous to those found in nuisance law, in which the law speaks to channeling behavior
rather than prohibiting it. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975). The Supreme
Court's Pacifica opinion quoted Justice Sutherland's opinion in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926), as support for the nuisance approach:
A 'nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place---like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard.' . . . We simply hold that when the Commission
finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does
not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
16. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749. (The rationale for channeling indecent speech to the late
evenings hours was to allow parents to properly control what their children could be exposed
to.). The usual justification for the regulation of broadcasting is that a limited number of
licenses are available and thus governmental intervention is justified. See NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (FCC regulation of certain broadcast content is proper because of
the limited nature of the available broadcast frequencies.).
17. See In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency, 65
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1038 (Dec. 21, 1988) (Under pressure from Congress that budget money
might be withheld, the FCC adopted a twenty-four-hour ban of indecency.); N.Y. Times, Dec.
24, 1988, at 46, col. 5 (FCC reinstates total ban on indecency.). But cf In re Infinity
Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 211, in which the FCC stated
that it did not have authority to completely ban indecent broadcasts from the airwaves. Id. at
215. The FCC stated that Pacifica did not give it authority to regulate programming that
might be objectionable to some audience members, but the Court did give it authority to
restrict the broadcast hours for such material. Id.
18. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
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audience and always has been entirely banned from broadcasting. 19
Placing the judicial seal of approval on a generic indecency stan-
dard is an unfortunate episode in first amendment law, regardless of
whether indecency is banned completely or only during the daytime.
First, it expands the FCC's authority to regulate protected speech 20
with a nonchalance that portends unbridled control in this area. Sec-
ond, it fails to articulate a precise standard by which unprotected
speech can be distinguished. As a result, a generic standard shows a
troubling disregard for following careful first amendment protection.
The FCC argues that, when balanced, the rights of parents to control
their children's access to indecency outweighs the free speech rights of
broadcasters. Yet, in the end, the FCC has the authority both to cate-
gorize indecent speech and then to balance the intangible interests
that are inherent in deciding whether a broadcast deserves first
amendment protection. There is little doubt that broadcasters, who
are subject to license renewal, will limit their speech, even though it
may be "decent," rather than risk the substantial economic losses that
would attend the nonrenewal of a license.
2'
Section II of this Comment outlines the first amendment ques-
tions involved in regulating broadcast indecency and the FCC's
approach to its authority in this area. Section III describes the factual
setting leading to the change in the FCC's indecency regulation. Sec-
19. To be obscene, material must meet a three-pronged test: 1) an average person,
applying contemporary community standards, must find that the material, as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest; 2) the material must depict or describe, in a patently offensive manner,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 3) the material, taken as a
whole, must lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 25 (1973). The Miller test applies to words as well as pictures and requires
consideration of the work "as a whole." Id. at 25 n.7. For an interesting discussion of the
obscenity issue, see Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589
(1986) (arguing for more specific rationales for restricting obscenity than the vague
justifications that it causes crime). The court's obscenity view had moved from a standard by
which obscenity was unprotected because the material was utterly worthless, see Roth v.
United States, 352 U.S. 964 (1957), to an approach in which the obscene material not only
must be utterly worthless but also must appeal to prurient interest as measured by community
standards, see Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), and finally to the Miller
standard. The most notable change in the Miller test is that it substitutes the Roth standard of
utter worthlessness with "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The
problem with any obscenity test, however, is that it ultimately will suffer from aspects of
overbreadth and vagueness. If the Court draws a test that is specific, such as one that
proscribes "any depiction of sexual or excretory activites," its test will suffer from overbreadth
because it does not account for scientific or artistic displays. If it tries to qualify this broad test
with phrases such as "prurient interests" and "patent offensiveness," the law ultimately will be
vague because the terms are meaningless in themselves.
20. See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Lengthening line of sellers adds to TV's buyers market, BROADCASTING, Nov.
28, 1988, at 51 (a local Cleveland television station was valued at $180 million).
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tion IV then analyzes the Action opinion and compares it with
Pacifica. Section V challenges the rationales for holding broadcasting
to a different first amendment standard than is applied to the print
media, and also examines the child audience. Section VI then argues
that the chilling effect of a generic indecency standard, because of its
overbreadth and vagueness, outweighs any of its purported advan-
tages. Finally, Section VII concludes that a standard similar to that
used for determining obscenity, which considers the entire broadcast,
should be employed to reduce that chilling effect.
II. INDECENT SPEECH: A BACKGROUND
Censorship that is based purely on the form of language used by
a speaker or writer is largely taboo in media other than broadcasting.
In order to analyze the disparate treatment of broadcasting, therefore,
one must consider the purpose of the first amendment, the history of
content control in broadcasting, the standard of judicial review for
broadcast cases, and the emergence of the FCC's regulation of
indecency.
A. The First Amendment Overview
The core controversy over the FCC's authority in content regula-
tion concerns defining free expression within the first amendment.
The drafters of the United States Constitution were keenly aware of
the potential repression of free speech by a centralized government.
22
They had experienced Great Britain's control of the colonial press by
licensing, which often led to imprisonment for publishing what the
government considered seditious.23 Despite this knowledge, the new
states ratified the Constitution without mention of free speech. It was
only after the First Congress met that the states adopted the Bill of
Rights, which provided for protection of free speech in the first
amendment.24
22. See generally T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE FIFTH ESTATE 111-30 (1986) (government control of the press by licensing was well
known to the framers) [hereinafter T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT].
23. Id.
24. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I; cf. T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, supra note 22. This was
the third of 12 amendments submitted to the states for ratification. Id. When the first two
failed, this became the first amendment to the Constitution. Id. Although early drafts of the
amendment included the language that freedom of press or speech could not be infringed upon
"by any state," the states struck a compromise, and the amendment provided only for a
control on the Congress. Id. It is well-established today, however, that the prohibitions of the
[Vol. 43:871
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Even though the first amendment has no clear definition of free
speech,25 many Supreme Court Justices have considered free expres-
sion to be intrinsic to American freedom.26 The first amendment
embodied America's most prized hopes that freedom would reign for
speech, assembly, petition, religion, the press, and, later by implica-
tion, association.27 An analysis of the first amendment should begin
with the question of whether freedom of speech should be regarded as
an end in itself-one that defines the type of society we wish to live
in-or if freedom of speech should be a means to an end, such as a
method of discovering "objective" truth or effecting proper govern-
ment.2s Generally, Supreme Court Justices and legal commentators
have relied on three broad models of the first amendment in order to
construct their conceptions of free speech protection. The first is the
"marketplace of ideas" model, the second is the "self-government"
model, and the third is the "self-fulfillment" model. In different ways,
these models define protected areas of speech in a manner that pro-
motes underlying values for why society or individuals need freedom
of expression.29
The Supreme Court primarily has utilized the "marketplace of
ideas" model in determining speech protection.30  The concept was
first amendment extend to all branches of the federal and state governments via the fourteenth
amendment. Id.
25. Records of the Constitutional Convention give little insight into the values given to
free speech, but it is known that the discussion of the Bill of Rights did not take place until the
last few days of the convention. See T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT supra note 22.
26. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Justice Cardozo, delivering
the opinion of the Court, stated that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable
condition necessary to nearly every other form of freedom.); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
23 (1970) (Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that the constitutional
right of free expression places "the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more
capable citzenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system
rests.").
27. Although freedom of association is not specifically mentioned in the first amendment's
text, it has been judicially recognized as deriving from the rights of speech and assembly. See
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (The freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty"
assured by the due process clause, which embraces freedom of speech.).
28. See DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a
Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161 (1972)
(The implementation of a system of freedom of expression should begin with an inquiry into
the purposes of the freedom as guaranteed by the first amendment.).
29. See Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 671 (1983) (Courts should adopt a language that permits a first amendment analysis of
concrete cases and produces decisions that are falsifiable in meaningful ways rather than
relying on categorical approaches.).
30. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
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first articulated by John Milton,31 and developed by John Stuart
Mill 32 and adopted by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his oft-cited
dissent in Abrams v. United States.33 This model challenges govern-
ment's authority to censor, with many of its proponents asserting that
"objective" truth is best tested by the ability of a thought to receive
acceptance in the competition of the market, and that society requires
truth to properly function. 34 Those seeking equal first amendment
status between print and broadcasting often enlist this model.35 They
argue that the marketplace must be as open as possible in order to
allow optimal access for the greatest number of messages.36 Critics of
the marketplace model, however, bemoan its failure to meet its goal
for two reasons: first, because truth is not and cannot be "objective,
' 37
and second, because the market analogy fails due to monopoly control
of the media. Thus, it is difficult to argue that speech can be an
instrument of truth in the media because so few have access to its
outlets.
The next first amendment model is that of "self-government,"
under which free speech is viewed as a necessary element for achiev-
ing proper government in a democracy. Speech, in this construct, is
vital for effective democratic political participation,38 for it permits
20 (1975) (The equality principle is apt to protect speech because it places an affirmative
burden on those who would justify a restriction on expression to demonstrate that it is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.).
31. J. MILTON, Areopagitica, in AREOPAGITICA AND OTHER PROSE WORKS 1, 38 (W.
Hailer ed. 1927) (offers seminal view that freedom of expression enhances the social good).
32. J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 135-36 (M.
Cowling ed. 1968):
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing
the human race.... If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity
of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a
benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error.
Id. at 135.
33. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes stated:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade of ideas-
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their




35. See L. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11-12
(1987).
36. Id. at 12.
37. DuVal, supra note 28, at 162.
38. Lewis, Keynote Address: The Right to Scrutinize Government: Toward a First
[Vol. 43:871
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the publication of violations that take place against the rights of
others in society.39 Without such freedom, the government simply
could silence those whose rights it invaded and improperly stockpile
power.4° Some proponents of this theory, most notably Professor
Alexander Meiklejohn, limit the application of this model to public
discussion on issues of civic importance-speech on public issues or
concerning self-governance. 41 Arguably, this model would not pro-
tect indecent speech because indecency concerns form rather than the
content of speech. It equally could be argued, however, that public-
issue-oriented speech that uses indecent language should be protected.
Critics of the "self-government" model point to the difficulty in deter-
mining which issues are public issues. In fact, almost any information
offered to the public could be termed as being of civic importance.
Furthermore, in Meiklejohn's view broadcast was no more than a
medium for entertainment, which categorically had no claim to the
principles of free speech, regardless of what subject was discussed.42
The remaining model, the paradigm of "self-fulfillment," holds
free expression to be an end in itself.43 Unlike the two utilitarian
models described above, the self-fulfillment model holds speech as a
constitutive part of personal autonomy and a basis for self-fulfill-
ment.' Rather than focusing on the intellectual and rational basis
relied on by the previous models, this model accommodates the emo-
tive role of free expression. Indecent speech therefore would be pro-
tected by this model because certain people may need to use such
language for personal fulfillment. This model is criticized, however,
as being too constricted in its vision because it ignores the necessity of
a societal approach to free expression.45 Ultimately, in an indecency
argument, there is a clash of self-expression liberties. One person's
Amendment Theory of Accountability, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 793 (1980) (In order to achieve
success in a self-governing democracy, there must be accountability through an informed
public.).
39. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL EXPRESSION 27 (2d ed. 1960); Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245.
40. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 39, at 27.
41. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948), revised as POLITICAL FREEDOM 78-79 (1960).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213-
14 (1972) (A rational government is one in which citizens can recognize its authority while still
regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, and rational agents.).
44. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970); see also
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963)
(Every man, in the development of his personality, has the right to form his own beliefs and
opinions and to express them.).
45. See Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT.
REV. 285, 313 (1982) (There are no single values served by protecting free speech, but only a
19891
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liberty to express himself with whatever language suits him meets
head-on with the liberty of a parent to shield his children from that
same language. In the end, government must decide which liberty
interest it will legitimize.
Although each of these models have valid criticisms, any satis-
factory theory of free speech must come to terms with their varied
implications. It is difficult to square the disparate treatment between
the print and broadcast mediums without analyzing each form of
speech within the context of the first amendment. Too often, in the
Supreme Court's discussion of the broadcast industry, however, the
Court fails to analyze the foundational values given speech by the first
amendment. It seems at times that Supreme Court Justices decide
cases solely on their normative judgments of speech protection, rather
than first amendment principles.
Broadcasting has suffered as part of the Supreme Court's search
for categorical protection of speech. Through the years, the Court
generally has defined the parameters of the first amendment by
excluding certain types of speech from the sphere of the amendment's
protection. In the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 6 for
example, the Court constructed a two-level theory.47 Protected
speech was placed on one level, while the other level was occupied by
categories of unprotected speech, such as speech that incites a fight,
48
obscenity,49 and libel.50 Since Chaplinsky, however, a multi-level
approach emerged in Supreme Court opinions with a series of speech
categories that receive less-than-complete constitutional protection.
These categories include speech that is inflicted upon captive audi-
ences,51 offensive or indecent in broadcasting, 52 commercial in
nature,5 3 near-obscene,5 4 nonobscene but dealing with child pornog-
conglomeration of traditionally accepted values, e.g., preventing the government from
silencing its critics.).
46. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (Calling someone a "damned
racketeer" and "damned fascist" amounts to using "fighting words.").
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
50. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(Government may treat libels against private citizens more severely than libels against public
officials.).
51. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952). An audience is said to be
captive when it is exposed to certain language by necessity and not by choice. Id. at 451. In
this case, vehicles equipped with loud speakers traveled the streets of cities blaring messages.
Id. These vehicles were said to deprive the audience of its volition to choose not to listen. Id.
52. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
53. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
(Regulation of commercial speech by the government must be weighed by a means-end test to
decide if first amendment values sufficiently outweigh the state's interest in regulation.). But
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raphy, 5 defamatory,56 and uttered by public employees.57
In order to understand the special treatment of broadcast speech,
one must first consider Cohen v. California.5 In Cohen, the defendant
was arrested in the corridor of a Los Angeles courthouse for dis-
turbing the peace by wearing a jacket, within the view of children,
which bore the slogan "Fuck the Draft." 59 Cohen was convicted and
he ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court," where Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority, carefully analyzed the role of offensive
speech within the first amendment.6' Harlan found that Cohen's act
was a form of speech that did not fit into any of the previously defined
unprotected categories.62 Thus, the issue became whether the state
could act as "guardians of public morality" in punishing the public
utterance of "this unseemly expletive in order to maintain what they
regard as a suitable level of discourse within the body politic."63 In
reversing Cohen's conviction, Harlan concluded that the Constitution
"leaves matters of taste and style largely to the individual.""
cf. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986)
(Puerto Rico could ban advertising for casino gambling aimed at its residents.).
54. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Nonobscene adult books and
movies are of lesser value than other types of speech, especially political debate.).
55. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (A state may ban the distribution of
materials depicting children engaged in sexual conduct, even though the material is not legally
obscene.).
56. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (The government may treat libels
against private citizens more severely than libels against public officials.).
57. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (A teacher's interest as a citizen
in making public comment must be balanced against the government's interest in promoting
the efficiency of its employees' public service.).
58. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
59. Id. at 15.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 20. Harlan stated: "It cannot plausibly be maintained that this vulgar allusion
to the Selective Service would conjure up such psychic stimulation in anyone likely to be
confronted with Cohen's crudely defaced jacket." Id. Nor is the statement an instance of
"fighting words" uttered face-to-face. Id. Nor did it involve inflicting offensive language on a
captive audience: "Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Id. at 21.
63. Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 25. Harlan's answer to the constitutional question of offensive speech offers an
interesting perspective:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as
diverse and populous as ours....
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to
be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however,
within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring
values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may
at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense, not a sign of weakness
but of strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. A Historical Perspective of Radio Regulation
It would appear that Cohen answered all the offensive speech
questions before they were raised seven years later in Pacifica and,
again, in Action. But this is where the special qualities of broadcast-
ing become an important factor and require, in the Supreme Court's
view, a different standard. Since the inception of comprehensive
broadcast regulation in 1927, Congress and federal regulatory agen-
cies enthusiastically have regulated the content of broadcast speech.65
Three reasons have been given for such regulation: first, the perva-
siveness of the broadcast medium into homes; second, the scarcity of
broadcast frequencies; and third, the government's licensure of broad-
casting requires it to pass laws that bring about the most efficient use
of stations.
In its early days, radio was considered to be an entertainment
medium.66 It developed in the early 1920s as amateur talk shows
emanating from garages and evolved into full-scale stations.67 There
was little applicable law in the early years, but it was clear that oper-
ating a radio station required some form of license. 68 At the time, few
Americans probably considered that the government's reaction
toward licensing this new, unknown medium was much like that of
seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of privilege,
these fundamental societal values are truly implicated....
Against this perception of the constitutional policies involved, we discern
certain more particularized considerations that peculiarly call for reversal of this
conviction. First, the principle contended for by the State seems inherently
boundless. How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? Surely
the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily
ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to
affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular four-letter word being
litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is
nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we
think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled
distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so
largely to the individual.
Id. at 24-25.
65. L. POWE, supra note 35, at 11-31.
66. Id.
67. G. ARCHER, HISTORY OF RADIO To 1926, at 249 (1938).
68. Id. at 106. In 1910, Congress passed an act to amend the Interstate Commerce laws by
extending their operation to interstate transmission of intelligence by wire and wireless. Id.
This regulation was extended in 1912 by an act that included radio-telegraphic
communication. Id. The Radio Act forbade the operation of a radio apparatus without a
license from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. Id. Further, it prohibited and penalized
willful and malicious interference with radio communication. Id. Uttering or transmitting
false or fraudulent signals called for a penalty of $2,500 or imprisonment for not more than
five years or both. Id.
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the English government when printing presses were developed 350
years earlier. 69 For the early broadcaster, it was not free speech con-
cerns but the recurrent problem of signal interference that made
licensing a good idea.7"
After much political haggling, Congress passed the Radio Act of
1927, 71 which established the airwaves as publicly owned and con-
trolled by the government.72 The Act was vague and suggested that a
radio license was a privilege that required, in return, that the licensee
use the license for some form of undefined public service. 3 The Act
set forth the powers and duties of the Federal Radio Commission-
the prototype of the FCC-and directed the agency to make regula-
tions in the "public interest, convenience or necessity."
74
With the new licensing scheme and the increasing demand of
would-be licensees, the government believed that broadcast content
regulation became justified based on the scarcity of the radio spec-
trum and the need to maximize the productive use of the limited
number of stations.7" The Supreme Court recognized these justifica-
tions in 1943 in NBC v. United States,76 and, again, twenty-five years
later in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC.77 NBC was an outgrowth of
the first FCC attempt to come to grips with the development and
apparent dominance of large broadcasting networks.7" In Red Lion,
by comparison, the Court decided that broadcasters could be required
to grant individuals the right to reply to personal attacks broadcast on
a station. 79 Thus, broadcasting could be shackled by more intrusive
69. W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 69 (1984).
70. G. ARCHER, supra note 67, at 104-06.
71. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
72. L. POWE, supra note 35, at 52-67.
73. Id. at 61.
74. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1982).
75. L. POWE, supra note 35, at 62.
76. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
77. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
78. NBC, 319 U.S. at 190. In pursuing competition in the broadcast industry, the FCC
passed a number of rules that encouraged localism in broadcasting. Id. at 194-95. NBC,
joined by other networks, attacked the rules, arguing in part that the FCC lacked the authority
under the Communications Act to make such rules, and that the rules violated the first
amendment. Id. at 209. The Supreme Court was unimpressed with the networks' arguments
and found that there was no first amendment violation. Id. at 226. The Court found that the
limited radio spectrum was a sufficient reason for allowing the FCC to affect the content of
broadcasts. Id. See also L. POWE, supra note 35, at 31-45.
79. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 370. A taped commercial program aired by the Red Lion
Broadcasting Company mentioned a journalist from New York in a politically disparaging
manner. Id. at 371-73. In due course, the FCC directed the radio station to provide free reply
time to the disparaged individual. Id. Red Lion protested, arguing that it had volunteered to
let the offended person reply on its station for a standard $5 fee, and otherwise claiming that
the imposition of the FCC order abridged its own editorial freedom under the first amendment.
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regulation because not everyone could be a broadcaster.
Under the scarcity of frequencies rationale, the government has a
right and obligation to regulate broadcast content to ensure that those
who are excluded will be given some measure of access and control. 80
This control -amounts to limiting what broadcasters can air, that is,
removing indecent material. Critics question, however, whether the
scarcity of frequencies rationale should continue to exist.8' Some
argue that if scarcity should be used as a rationale, then newspapers-
often having little or no competition--certainly are more scarce than
broadcast stations.
82
C. Judicial Review and Broadcasting
Judicial discussions of broadcast content regulation establish that
broadcasting is judged by a standard that is narrowly tailored to fur-
ther a substantial governmental interest,8 3 and not by the compelling
interest standard that is applied to the regulation of speech content in
other first amendment areas.8 4 From the inception of broadcast regu-
Id. The FCC and the Supreme Court disagreed, unanimously holding that the FCC had acted
within its statutory authority, and that this did not offend the first amendment because
broadcasters are held to a different standard due to the scarcity rationale. Id. at 396-401. But
cf CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (court rejected the view that a
limited right of access existed for political advertising.).
80. See Dyk, Full First Amendment Freedom for Broadcasters: The Industry as Eliza on
the Ice and Congress as the Friendly Overseer, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 299, 309 (1988) (Full first
amendment protection is critical to preserving the independence and vitality of the broadcast
medium.).
81. The D.C. Circuit, in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d
501, 506-07 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987), urged the Supreme Court to
reconsider the scarcity theory as contradictory to the principles of the first amendment. Id.
Judge Bork was joined in the opinion by judge, now Justice, Scalia. Id. at 502. See also
Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988); Syracuse
Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd 5043, 5048-49, 5054-55 (1987), petition for review pending, Nos.
87-1516, 87-1544 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 1987).
82. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250 (1974). In Tornillo,
the Court found that newspapers are not required to give reply space for a personal attack. Id.
The Court rejected the argument that the economic scarcity of newspapers-that is, the
economic difficulty in starting a newspaper- was a sufficient reason to require newspapers to
print replies to personal attacks. Id. Newspapers would tend to avoid subjects that would
trigger the right to reply, which would dampen the vigor of the press's coverage of public
events. Id.
83. Id.; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Government regulation of
conduct may be justified if the regulation furthers a substantial government interest, which
outweighs the suppression of free expression.); but cf Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434
(1986)(Regulations requiring cable television operators, upon request and without
compensation, to transmit to their subscribers every over-the-air television broadcast signal
that was "significantly viewed in the community," or otherwise considered local under the
FCC's rules, violated the first amendment.).
84. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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lation to date, the Supreme Court only once-in the 1984 case of FCC
v. League of Women Voters 81-has found a regulation of broadcast
content unconstitutional. In League of Women Voters, the Court
invalidated a prohibition on editorializing by public stations that
receive federal funds.8 6 A major point of contention also swirls
around the Fairness Doctrine"7 and the rights of federal candidates to
receive access to the airwaves.
88
The rationale that courts give for encumbering broadcasters with
special regulation includes the intrusive nature of airwaves into the
home and the broadcast signal's unique accessibility to children.89
Unlike other forms of communication that may require an affirmative
act of purchasing or reading, broadcasting requires a comparatively
passive act-pushing a button or turning a dial at home.90 Children,
by the simple act of operating a radio or television, also become more
accessible to material that may not meet the approval of their
parents.91
The Court, however, should not use these justifications as an
85. See Dyk, supra note 80, at 308 (The Supreme Court only once has struck down a
content-based FCC regulation.).
86. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 364.
87. The Fairness Doctrine requires that broadcasters devote time to controversial issues of
public importance and, when they do so, that they present opposing views on those issues. See
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1967) (approved aspects of the FCC's
Fairness Doctrine, under which broadcasters are required to share their frequency with others,
at least in a limited manner); but see, In re Syracuse Peace Council, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1073 (1987) (The FCC held that the Fairness Doctrine, on its face, violates the first
amendment and contravenes the public interest.); Fairness held unfair, BROADCASTING, Aug.
10, 1987, at 27. FCC General Counsel Diane Killory stated that the scarcity rationale does
not justify imposing broadcast content regulations. Id. at 3 1. FCC Chairman Dennis Patrick,
when announcing the Syracuse decision, stated:
Our action today should be cause for celebration, because by it we introduce the
first amendment into the 20th century. Because we believe it will serve the public
interest, we seek to extend to the electronic press the same First Amendment
guarantees that the print media have enjoyed since our country's inception ....
[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee a fair press, only a free press ....
[T]he record in this proceeding leads one inescapably to conclude that the
fairness doctrine chills free speech, is not narrowly tailored to achieve any
substantial government interest, and therefore contravenes the First Amendment
and the public interest. As a consequence, we can no longer impose fairness
doctrine obligations on broadcasters and simultaneously honor our oath of office.
By this action, we honor that oath, and, we believe, we promote the public
interest.
Id. at 27.
88. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (FCC, acting pursuant to congressional
authorization, could constitutionally require broadcasters to give reasonable, good faith
attention to federal candidates' requests to buy advertising time.).
89. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
90. Id. at 749; see also Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C. 2d 777 (1973).
91. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
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excuse for not following the arduous requirements that the first
amendment places on any curtailment of protected speech. The anal-
ysis of government regulations in the first amendment area generally
fall into two tracks: (1) regulations aimed at the communicative
impact of an act; and (2) regulation of the noncommunicative aspects
of an act.92 Regulations of broadcast content should fall within the
first track and, thus, the regulation should be unconstitutional unless
the government shows that the message is in some way unprotected
by the first amendment.93 Indecency has ambiguous effects on its
audience, and therefore the government should be required to show a
compelling interest to make a content-based regulation of indecency.94
D. The FCC's Authority for Regulation of Indecency
The FCC finds its authority to regulate indecent speech in Sec-
tion 1464 of the United States Criminal Code, which provides that the
broadcast of "any obscene, indecent or profane language" is actiona-
ble.95 Facially, this contradicts Section 326 of the Federal Communi-
cations Act, which states that "no regulation or condition shall be
92. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789 (1987). Under the first
track analysis, the government aims at the ideas or information of the speaker.because of the
negative effect it may have on the audience. Id. When the government regulation is aimed at
unprotected speech, such as defamation, only minimal due process scrutiny is required. Id. at
792. On the second track, the government's interest in regulation is balanced against the value
of free expression. Id.
93. Id.
94. The Supreme Court has allowed regulation of the content of speech when an ordinance
is aimed at "secondary effects" rather than the particular content of speech. City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). In Renton, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance
that prohibited adult theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of a residential area, dwelling,
church, park, or school. Id. at 49. The Court reasoned that the ordinance was aimed, not at
the content of the films shown at adult theaters, but at the secondary effects of such theaters on
the surrounding community. Id. at 49. The Court stated that the ordinance is designed to
prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property value, and generally help the
quality of life in the community. Id. at 48. The Renton view, however, has opened the door
for wholesale restriction of sexually explicit material. Under this rationale, listener reaction to
a broadcast message might be considered a "secondary effect," thus giving the FCC unbridled
discretion to impose a variety of content regulations. It is notable that, along with indecency,
television violence often is cited for its ill effects on audience members. Under a "secondary
effects" rationale, broadcast violence might be equally susceptible to restriction. Furthermore,
if the FCC were truly concerned with the effects of broadcast material on children, it might
adopt rules to restrict broadcasts of such fringe groups as the Klu Klux Klan. Soon, if this
rationale were followed, the protection of children might be used to allow the broadcast of only
what is acceptable to the vocal majority of the country.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982). Section 1464 provides: "Whoever utters any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id. This section is one of a group of
four similar statutes which prohibit the mailing, importation, and interstate transportation of
obscenity.
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promulgated or fixed by the commission which shall interfere with the
right of free speech by means of radio communication." 96 Further-
more, indecent speech, which is most notably distinguished from
obscene speech by its lack of prurient appeal, cannot be regulated by
the government under the first amendment as applied to the print
media or private conversations. 97 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in
Pacifica found that the aforementioned statutes were not in conflict
and the first amendment did not impede some control over what is
broadcast. Thus, FCC censorship could prevent the broadcast of
obscene, indecent, or profane language.9
Pacifica, which is the Supreme Court's only treatment of the
broadcast indecency issue, arose at a time when the FCC was under
considerable pressure from Congress and the White House to clear
the airwaves of sex and violence. 99 As the sexual revolution burgeoned
across the nation, radio stations devoted more broadcast time to sub-
jects that pushed the edge of what might be said in polite company. 1oo
Against this background of change, New York's WBAI-a public
broadcasting station licensed to Pacifica Foundation, Inc.-aired a
twelve-minute monologue from comedian George Carlin's album
"Occupation: Foole" during a school day in October 1973.101 The
monologue was part of a program that dealt with attitudes toward
language in contemporary society and was intended to highlight soci-
96. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 326 (1982). Section 326 provides: "Nothing
in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of
censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication." Id.
97. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Supreme Court reversed the conviction
of a man who walked through a county courthouse, where children were present, wearing a
jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft." Id. Cohen was convicted under a statute
prohibiting "offensive conduct" in public. Id. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the
conviction and defined "offensive conduct" as "behavior which has a tendency to provoke
others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace." Id. It further concluded that the
conviction was justified, for it was "reasonably foreseeable" that others might be provoked to
violent reaction by Cohen's jacket. Id. Writing the majority opinion for the Supreme Court,
Justice Harlan found that offensive speech is protected by the first amendment. Id. at 20.
Harlan found that the language used on Cohen's jacket was not obscene. Id. He further found
that those in the courthouse were not a captive audience because they could avert their glance.
Id. at 21. Finally, Harlan rejected the alternative rationale for censoring offensive speech-the
argument that the states may regulate such speech to maintain the "public morality." Id. at
22. In his view, the dangers that attend such regulation far outweigh any benefits that might
be derived from it. Id. at 23.
98. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741.
99. See generally L. POWE, supra note 35, at 162-90 (Both the President and Congress
effect political pressure on the FCC.).
100. Id.
101. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730.
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ety's perceptions of "dirty" words.10 2 In his routine, Carlin propheti-
cally announced the seven words that could not be said on the
airwaves. '
0 3
The FCC received a single complaint from a man who said he
heard the Carlin broadcast while driving in his car with his fifteen-
year-old son.°4 The complainant, John R. Douglas, was a member of
the national planning board of Morality in the Media and a Florida
resident who lived well outside of WBAI's signal.105 After sitting on
the complaint for a year, the FCC announced that Carlin's mono-
logue was indecent and could be banned, except for possible late-night
broadcast when children were not likely to be listening.10 6 The FCC
then drafted an indecency standard that essentially is the same as the
one now in place.'0 7 Regardless of the literary, artistic, or scientific
value-part of the test for obscenity-indecent language could not be
aired no matter who wished to hear it.'08 News organizations imme-
diately sought clarification and were told that live news events could
use the proscribed words only if there was no time to edit them.' ° 9
WBAI appealed to the D.C. Circuit, claiming that the FCC's
standard was overbroad, vague, and unconstitutionally applied to
speech that was protected under the first amendment." 0 Citing Sec-
tion 326-the no-censorship admonition of the Communications
Act-the Court found the FCC's decision unconstitutional."' Chief
Judge Bazelon viewed Section 326 as coextensive with the first
amendment, thereby requiring the same protection of speech." 2 He
concluded that the FCC's definition of indecency was too broad and
that the FCC incorrectly asserted that material subject to regulation
for children could be banned from broadcast to adults. ' a Despite the
102. Id.
103. Id. at 751.
104. Id. at 730.
105. BROADCASTInG, July 10, 1978, at 20.
106. On February 21, 1975, the FCC issued a declaratory order holding the seven words
used in Carlin's monologue indecent within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1464. Pacifica
Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975). While not imposing formal sanctions against the
station, the FCC noted that Pacifica Foundation could have been subject to sanctions. Id.
107. Id. at 98. In the FCC's order, it attempted to clarify the meaning of indecency as
"language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the
day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." Id.
108. Id.
109. 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1975).
110. Final FCC adjudications can be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1982).
111. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
112. Id. at 37.
113. Id.
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strong cries for first amendment protection in the D.C. Circuit's opin-
ion, however, the theory expressed by Judge Leventhal in his dissent
had the greatest long-term effect on indecency. 1 4 Judge Leventhal
emphasized the limited posture of the case, asserting that the Carlin
monologue should be considered solely as broadcast and not against
an FCC indecency standard.' 5 It was only after the FCC subse-
quently adopted Leventhal's position on appeal that regulation of
indecency met with success in the Supreme Court.1 1 6 Some critics, in
fact, theorize that the FCC may have adopted Leventhal's more lim-
ited approach because of a change in Presidents from Ford to Carter,
which resulted in a personnel change in the Commission itself.1
The Supreme Court embraced the FCC's limited indecency scope
in finding that the FCC's action did not amount to a promulgation of
broad regulation, but merely a limited adjudication of a narrow fac-
tual issue.Is As such, the Court restricted its review to the particular
words in the Carlin monologue in deciding the constitutionality of
regulating indecent programming. 9 The Court upheld the FCC's
view without a majority opinion on the constitutional issues.1 20 Jus-
tice Stevens' three-man plurality opinion found that Carlin's "seven
dirty words" could be regulated within the context in which they were
used, but four justices flatly disagreed. 121 Stevens, in a portion of his
opinion joined by four other justices, noted that the FCC's decision
114. Id. at 30-37.
115. Id
116. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the D.C. Circuit, and upheld the
FCC's order. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. The Court found that the FCC had the authority to
impose sanctions under the specific facts of the case before it. Id. at 750.
117. Powe, The FCC's Indecency Rerun, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 571, 575 (1988).
118. The Supreme Court stated:
[The Supreme Court] reviews judgments, not statements in opinions ... That
admonition has special force when the statements raise constitutional questions,
for it is our settled practice to avoid the unnecessary decision of such issues.
However appropriate it may be for an administrative agency to write broadly in
an adjudicatory proceeding, federal courts have never been empowered to issue
advisory opinions.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 734-35 (citations omitted).
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), Justice Stevens' plurality opin-
ion stated for the first time that offensive displays and speech categorically may receive lesser
first amendment protection. Id. Stevens' opinion found that portions of a Detroit "Anti-Skid
Row Ordinance," which differentiated between motion picture theaters that exhibit sexually
explicit movies and those that do not, were constitutional. Id. at 54. But ef Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (The Court sustained a challenge to the facial validity of an
ordinance prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from showing movies with "the human male or
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rested on "a nuisance rationale under which context is all-impor-
tant." 22 Stevens suggested that the time of day of a broadcast and
the composition of the audience based on the type of program were
examples of "context," along with whether the transmission took
place on radio, television or closed circuit.123 The Court, however,
overlooked the fact that WBAI aired the Carlin monologue in the
early afternoon while most children were in school, and that little
chance existed that young children would listen to a public radio sta-
tion such as WBAI.124 These points appear to place the Carlin broad-
cast in a "context" within which Stevens would allow indecent
broadcasts.
Noticeably absent from Pacifica is the scarcity rationale that usu-
ally is offered to distinguish different levels of control over the print
and broadcast mediums. 125 In fact, the Court recently has questioned
this critically disfavored rationale. 126 Instead, the Court noted the
intrusiveness of radio into the home, making it "uniquely accessible to
children" and "uniquely pervasive."' 27 The implication is that if the
material is not good enough for children, adults may not hear it
either, unless they remain awake past 10 p.m. Furthermore, it seems
illogical that radios are any more an "intruder" into a home than a
newspaper or magazine. Unlike the captive audience situation in
which amplification instruments are used to blast messages from the
street, 128 radios and televisions, and their signals, are acquired by the
volitional acts of users. 29 Moreover, newspapers are more accessible
to youths, who can freely purchase them, and magazines are perused
at any corner convenience store. Stevens, however, argued that a first
grade student who may not be able to read profane language would
instantly understand it if heard. 130 This point, of course, raises the
122. Id. at 750.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 729.
125. The scarcity of frequencies rationale, which suggests that broadcasting should be
subject to government control because there is a fixed number of frequencies that are exceeded
by the number who wish to use them, has generally been criticized by academicians for
supporting the regulation of broadcast content. See, e.g., L. PowE, supra note 35, at 197-215.
126. In FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Supreme Court
questioned the frequently criticized airwaves scarcity doctrine and asked Congress or the FCC
to confront the problem. 468 U.S. 364, 376-77n.11.
127. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
128. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96-97 (1949) (The Court upheld a ban on
amplification devices operated in public places that emit "loud and raucous noises.").
129. For a further discussion of this point, see infra Section V.
130. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747-50. Stevens raised this point in trying to distinguish Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1970), which held that offensive speech is protected under the first
amendment. Id.
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question of whether protection of young children from "dirty" lan-
guage is proper where the language is double entendre and innuendo
that is beyond the young child's comprehension.1 3 1 In other words,
should all forms of indecent speech be banned or merely those that
young children may latch onto?1
32
The FCC nearly decided not to appeal Pacifica to the Supreme
Court. 133 The FCC long had asserted that it had some authority over
broadcast content, but in touching on indecency, the Commission was
attacking an area that apparently had been decided in Cohen v. Cali-
fornia as protected under the first amendment. 134 Still, an indecency
standard was alluring because the FCC could avoid the rigors of hold-
ing language to the level of inquiry required of obscenity standards. 135
Therefore, language did not have to appeal to the prurient interests of
listeners to be indecent, and a variable community standard was
unnecessary. 136 FCC members, however, still were unsure if the
Supreme Court would be agreeable to this truncated standard for
morality. 1
37
Prior to Pacifica, the FCC cautiously approached defining a stan-
dard for indecency. '31 Although there was recurrent discussion of the
fear that the airwaves could be used as "a purveyor of smut and pat-
ent vulgarity" without controls, 139 it was not until the late 1960s that
131. See infra Sections IV and V.
132. Id.
133. See BROADCASTNG, July 10, 1978, at 20. After the D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC's
decision in Pacifica, commission attorneys recommended against seeking Supreme Court
review for fear of a further defeat. Id. The FCC eventually appealed to the Supreme Court
because FCC commissioners insisted on testing the extent of their authority to deal with
indecent programming. Id.
134. See supra note 97, at 15.
135. See supra note 19.
136. See supra note 19.
137. See infra Sections IV and V.
138. The first case that dealt with indecent broadcasts was In re Applications of E.G.
Robinson, Jr., TR/Palmetto Broadcast Co., WDKD, Kingstree, S.C., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962),
reconsideration denied, 34 F.C.C. 101 (1963). E.G. Robinson, Jr. v. FCC, 334 F.2d 584, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964). The issue of offensive programming was raised in conjunction
with a license renewal hearing. Id. In 1960, the FCC received complaints that the Charlie
Walker show, broadcast between January and April 1960, consisted of "vulgar, suggestive
material susceptible of double meaning" and indecent connotations. Id. at 266. During the
license renewal process, the radio station owner argued that he was unaware of the content in
Walker's show. Id. at 267. The FCC denied the renewal. Id. at 308; see also In re Sonderling
Broadcasting Corp., WGLD-FM, Oak Park, Ill., 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973) (upholding the
FCC's finding that a radio broadcast was indecent and obscene); WUHY-FM, Eastern
Education Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970) (finding guitarist Jerry Garcia's four-letter words
offensive.).
139. Palmetto Broadcast Co., 33 F.C.C. at 256.
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offensive speech became a significant problem on radio." Some legal
commentators have argued that the problem of offensive speech on
radio never was as great for television because the networks and their
affiliates always aimed at the largest possible audience, which resulted
in sanitizing broadcasts. 14 1 With the cultural revolution of the 1960s,
however, radio stations began to exhibit the more particularized and
diverse interests of the nation. 142 Radio stations relaxed program-
ming standards and the need to find a standard for regulation of inde-
cency increased. The problem for the FCC, however, was developing
a standard in lieu of the Supreme Court's troubled lead in defining
obscenity. 143
Five years before Pacifica, the FCC assessed a $100 fine against
WUHY-FM, Eastern Education Radio, for broadcasting language
similar to that found in Carlin's monologue.'" That case involved an
interview aired in 1970 with Jerry Garcia, a member of the Grateful
Dead, a popular rock group.14 During the interview-in which Gar-
cia expressed views concerning ecology, philosophy, music, and inter-
personal relationships-Garcia used the words "fuck" and "shit"
repeatedly within the flow of conversation. 4 6 The FCC identified
these words as having no social value and serving no public pur-
pose. 1 The FCC thus made its first frontal attack on speech that it
believed deviated from social norms, but was within the first amend-
ment's protection. This was the first time the FCC charged a station
with violating Section 1464 of the United States Criminal Code,
which prohibits the broadcast of indecent language.
148
The case is notable for asserting the early FCC views on both the
fear that indecent broadcasts would proliferate and the problem of
children's access to such language. ' 49 The case also offers the first
140. L. POWE, supra note 35, at 162-63.
141. Id. (discussing the network editing of the movie Midnight Cowboy).
142. Id. at 164-67.
143. See H. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION 33-54 (1987); McClure, Censorship of
Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960) (discussing
the evolving definition of obscenity).
144. WUHY-FM, Eastern Educational Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 412 (1970).
145. Id. at 412.
146. Id.
147. The FCC concluded that Garcia's language "is patently offensive by contemporary
community standards with very serious consequences to the 'public interest in the larger more
effective use of radio.'" Id. at 410 (citations omitted). Garcia's language, however, offers a
good example of how the first amendment should protect self-expression purely because it
encourages personal autonomy. Garcia's language was normal within the context of his
feelings on the subjects he was discussing. The four-letter words he used were not offered to
shock the audience, but to emphasize his emotions and to properly communicate his meaning.
148. See supra note 95.
149. WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 411.
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formal definition of indecency as material broadcast that is patently
offensive by contemporary community standards, and is utterly with-
out redeeming social value. 150 It appeared from this definition that a
mere indecent word, perhaps offensive only to the most susceptible
listener, was sufficient to ban an entire broadcast. Most interesting in
this initial foray into fashioning an indecency standard is that the
sanction of the Garcia broadcast did not arise from a citizen's com-
plaint;'5" rather the FCC's staff actually had been monitoring the
show. "'52 Conspicuously absent in the case, however, was an explana-
tion for why indecent speech should undergo a lesser protection than
obscene speech.
The FCC of the early 1970s, under the mandate of the Nixon
administration, appeared to be molding broadcasting into a form most
suitable to white, middle-class America. 153 Besides attacking indecent
language on the radio, there also were efforts to ban songs that advo-
cated the use of drugs.' 54 Despite the FCC's early attempts to instill
the fear of sanctions into broadcasters, between June 1972 and June
1973 the number of complaints of obscene, indecent, or profane
broadcasts had a fifteen-fold increase from 2,141 to 32,438, exceeding
by more than 10,000 the number of complaints received on all other
topics. 155 During this period, a radio format known as "topless
radio," which often featured explicit conversations about sexual
behavior, exploded across the nation. 56  The FCC, responding to
150. Id. at 410. This FCC definition of indecency differed significantly from the Supreme
Court's definition of obscenity at the time. Cf A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). In A Book
Named Woman of Pleasure, the Supreme Court defined the evolution of obscenity from its
beginning in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957):
Under [the Roth definition of obscenity,] as elaborated in subsequent cases, three
elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c)
the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
A Book Named Woman of Pleasure, 383 U.S. at 418. The FCC's definition of indecency omit-
ted the necessity of using the "dominant theme" of the work to censor an offensive word.
WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 410. The Supreme Court had wrestled with requiring a dominant
theme approach because for years judges had made ad hoc exceptions for "classic" works that
contained questionable passages. See, e.g., United States v. One Book called "Ulysses," 5 F.
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
151. See L. POWE, supra note 35, at 176 (1987).
152. WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d, at 409 n.2.
153. L. POWE, supra note 35, at 162-65, 179-177.
154. Id. at 176-82.
155. FCC News Release (August 2, 1973), quoted in Powe, Cable and Obscenity, 24 CATH.
U.L. Rev. 719, 732 (1975).
156. See BROADCASTING, Oct. 23, 1972, at 35.
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pressure to act against the outrageous programs, targeted Chicago
radio station WGLD-FM.' 57 The FCC determined that a popular
call-in talk show entitled "Femme Forum," which was aired between
10 a.m. and 3 p.m., violated both indecency and obscenity stan-
dards. ' 58  The FCC focused on a particular broadcast of this show
that included explicit personal accounts of oral sex.' 9 The FCC
apparently believed these personal accounts to be so graphic that a
mere indecency standard did not suffice.
The radio station paid a $2,000 fine rather than appeal the rul-
ing. 16 Two citizens groups, however, sought petition for reconsidera-
tion of the fine from the FCC.16' These requests were denied, which
led the groups to petition the D.C. Circuit for review. In Illinois Citi-
zens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC,'62 the D.C. Circuit upheld
the FCC's ruling. 63 A disagreement arose within the court, however,
as to what standard of obscenity to apply because between the FCC's
resolution of the case and the appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme
Court decided Miller v. California,'" which set a new standard for
defining obscenity. 165  The citizens groups then sought a rehearing,
but the D.C. Circuit denied the request despite an impassioned dissent
by Judge Bazelon, who argued that the Commission's action "illus-
trat[ed] a whole range of 'raised eyebrow' tactics" of FCC regulation,
instances of which were "legion."
166
157. In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d 919 (1973), aff'd sub
nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
158. Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, in a dissenting opinion, argued that it is improper to
regulate both indecent and obscene language. Id. at 921. He attacked the regulation of
indecency as constitutionally imprecise. Id. Johnson argued that the commission did not
properly investigate the community standards in the Philadelphia area, which allowed the
personal tastes of four commissioners to be used as the gauge for indecency. Id. at 922.
Johnson found that the FCC had embarked on unprecedented censorship. Id. Johnson also
argued that the majority did not define the community whose standards were supposed to have
been violated. Id. Finally, Johnson argued that enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 should be
left to the Justice Department, which would leave the problem of defining Section 1464 to the
federal courts. Id.
159. Id. at 923.
160. Id. at 920.
161. Id. at 785 (reconsideration hearing). The citizen groups were the Illinois Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting and the Illinois Division of the American Civil Liberties Union.
Id. at 777.
162. 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
163. Id.
164. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
165. See supra note 19.
166. Illinois Citizens Committee, 515 F.2d at 407-09. Judge Bazelon particularly found
problems with the court's finding of obscenity because the court only listened to a twenty-two-
minute tape recording, thereby not allowing the court to consider the work as a whole. Id. at
417. Judge Bazelon argued that the specificity requirement of Miller was designed to provide
REGULATION OF BROADCAST INDECENCY
Similar to its treatment of the WUHY-FM broadcast of the Gar-
cia interview, the FCC misapplied the obscenity test in reaching its
conclusion. The FCC had a particularly difficult task to find this talk
show format offensive to the community as a whole because it was the
top-rated show in the Chicago area. 167 The D.C. Circuit, however, did
not appear to be too concerned with the misapplication. First, the
court solved the "dominant theme" problem by arguing that listening,
unlike reading and watching, was episodic, and therefore anything
dealing with sex became the "dominant theme."' 168  Next, it resur-
rected Ginzburg v. United States 169-a case previously limited to its
particular facts-for the proposition that nonobscene materials could
be found to be obscene if they involved "pandering."' 170  The court
found that the announcer's efforts to solicit female callers to discuss
sex amounted to pandering.1 7' Thus, indecency took on an amor-
phous quality that could be distinguished, in part, by the speaker's
effort to incite offensive discussion. After the FCC sanctioned
"Femme Forum," there really was no identifiable standard. The talk
show did not violate the "dirty words" test of WUHY-FM, but it was
not clear what standard was violated. Therefore, this left the issue to
be decided in Pacifica.
more than fair notice to the broadcaster-it was designed to protect listeners who cannot get
access to the programming they desired. Id. at 421.
Judge Bazelon further complained that the FCC's separate standard of indecency was
inconsistent with the Miller obscenity standard because it was devoid of the requirement that
material appeal to prurient interest in sex. Id. at 423. The issue of whether the material had
redeeming social value was not even considered, which in effect could chase all sex-oriented
talk shows off the air. Id. Bazelon also questioned whether the "FCC as a national
administrative agency" was equipped to make findings that would better be left to courts,
particularly with a community standard involved. Id. at 423-24. In conclusion, Bazelon
wrote:
The First Amendment must, first, last and always, depend on the force of reason
and constitutional command to vindicate its principle in favor of such unpopular
speech as we have here. The Amendment is fragile, its commands easily avoided
and its defense always difficult because the easy cases never come into court.
Id. at 424.
167. 41 F.C.C.2d at 924 (Commissioner Johnson, dissenting).
168. Illinois Citizens Committee, 515 F.2d at 405-06.
169. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). In Ginzburg, the defendant had emphasized the sexually
provocative nature of the materials he sold through the mail by postmarking them with
"Middlesex, N.J." Id. at 468. The court reasoned that, even if the mailed materials were not
obscene, the lines of obscenity were crossed by the pandering manner of the advertising. Id.
Thus the court held that it was illegal to market materials in a sexually provocative manner if
the marketing would appeal to "prurient interests." Id. at 474.
170. Illinois Citizens Committee, 515 F.2d at 405.
171. Id.
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III. ACTION FOR CHILDREN'S TELEVISION: MAKING
PACIFICA WORKABLE
A. The Factual Setting of the Case
The FCC, primarily through staff rulings, followed Pacifica with
an enforcement standard effectively limited to the repetitive use of
words virtually identical to those used in the Carlin "Filthy Words"
monologue.1 72 In fact, the early cases suggested a reluctance to take
any action that would not survive judicial scrutiny. The rule
remained that indecent broadcasts could be aired only after 10 p.m.
In 1986, however, the FCC received complaints concerning three
broadcasts that ultimately led it to conclude that the post-Pacifica
approach had been too narrow.'73 The three FCC decisions were
appealed to the D.C. Circuit under the case name of Action For Chil-
dren's Television v. FCC.
74
The first complaint that led to the FCC policy change involved a
program broadcast on KPFK-FM, Los Angeles, California-once
172. Soon after the Pacifica decision, a similar complaint of indecent programming arose in
In re Application of WGBH Educational Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250 (1978). WGBH had
come up for license renewal, and Morality in Media of Massachusetts, Inc. (Morality) filed a
petition to deny the renewal application based on allegations that WGBH consistently had
broadcast offensive programming. Id. The FCC rejected the allegations and granted the
license renewal, stressing that it could not deny a license because certain materials were
"offensive to some or even a substantial number of listeners," and that overall performance
must be considered. Id. Furthermore, it stated that it only had the prerogative to intervene in
cases of language similar to that found in Pacifica. Id. at 1254.
Not long after WGBH, the FCC refused to take action against a gubernatorial candidate
who used the word "nigger" in his political spot announcements. In re Complaint by Julian
Bond Atlanta NAACP, Atlanta, Georgia, 69 F.C.C.2d 943 (1978). The Commission found
that such an utterance did not fall within the mandates of Pacifica. Id.
The Commission next dealt with the question of indecent broadcasting in 1982. A
complaint had been received concerning an amateur radio buff in California named Kenneth
Gilbert. In re Revocation of License of Kenneth L. Gilbert, 92 F.C.C.2d 130 (1982). An
investigator found that Gilbert deliberately interfered with the frequencies of two other
broadcasters, occasionally using four-letter words. Id. The FCC suspended Gilbert's license
for his intentional interference with the other radio operators and ruled that Gilbert's bad
language was indecent within the definition of Pacifica. Id.
In 1983, the FCC rejected a complaint against a radio station for broadcasting a morning
show that consistently contained "off color" remarks. In re Review Filed by Decency in
Broadcasting, Inc. of a Denial of Its Complaint against Rahall Broadcasting of Indiana, 94
F.C.C.2d 1162 (1983). Also during that year, a Pacifica Foundation station was challenged,
while up for license renewal, for allegedly broadcasting indecent language, including the words
"motherfucker" and "shit." In re Application of Pacifica Foundation for Renewal of License
for Noncommercial Station, WPFW-FM, Washington, D.C., 95 F.C.C.2d 750, 760 (1983).
The FCC, however, determined that the use of profanity was occasional, and therefore it did
not come within the purview of Pacifica. Id. at 760-61.
173. New Indecency Enforcement Standards To Be Applied To All Broadcast And
Amateur Radio Licenses, Public Notice, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1218 (April 29, 1987).
174. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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again a licensee of Pacifica Foundation, Inc. 75 A regularly aired pro-
gram entitled "I Am Are You?" was broadcast on Sunday, August
31, 1986, between 10 and 11 p.m. 76 It contained excerpts from a play
called "The Jerker," which included a scene in which two homosex-
ual men have a telephone conversation that includes explicit descrip-
tions of anal intercourse and other sexual activity.
77
In response to an initial FCC inquiry, KPFK-FM contended that
175. In re Pacifica Radio, 2 F.C.C. Rd 2698 (April 29, 1987).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2700. A portion of "The Jerker" was excerpted in the FCC's opinion. The
material that follows probably is shocking, if not offensive, to most adults. The FCC excerpted
it as a prime example of how the seven-dirty-word method failed. It is notable, however, that
the FCC chose to lift small sections of a play that dealt with a serious subject-death. The
play therefore cannot be judged fairly by these phrases alone. The opinion's excerpts began:
"Yeah, it was loving even if you didn't know whose cock it was in the dark or whose asshole
you were sucking." Id. at 2700. At another point, a character says no one could tell him that
he was immoral if he loved "sucking ass," "taking piss from a guy's cock," or if he had "a
quickie blow job in the Union Square men's room." Id. During a second vignette in the
presentation, one character is trying to excite the other by telling a story that contained the
following excerpts:
"We cuddled and played around a bit before he started working on my ass."
"I remember he was kneeling between my legs and he worked my asshole
with lube for the longest time-just gettin' it to relax so there was no tension, no
fear."
"He lowered himself on top of me and slid his dick in all the way, but so
gently, so smoothly, there wasn't even a bit of pain."
"His cock felt warm inside me-and full-so nice and full. So he began
sliding his cock back and forth inside of my ass--but so gently, so gently."
"I don't think I've ever had such a gentle, sensitive fuck before or after.
Well, he must [sic] gone at it for twenty minutes at the very least, just slidin' his
cock back and forth inside my ass."
"And then he whispered to me, 'You're gonna feel me come inside of you.'
And I did. Man, I could feel the cum pulse up his shaft inside of my ass. I could
count the pulses and it felt warm and good."
And later in the program this exchange:
Actor 1: "You better get yourself ready for some brother-to-brother,
sweaty, down-and-dirty, pig sex, you understand?"
Actor 2: "Yeah!"
1: "None of this nicey-nice, lovey-dovey stuff. I want to make you eat ass,
suck my balls and drink my piss like you never have before. You get me?"
2: "Hot throbbing cocks, hard pounding muscles."
1: "You've got it."
Id.
Few people would argue that children should be exposed to exchanges of this type. In
fact, "The Jerker" as excerpted may have even violated the Supreme Court's obscenity stan-
dard. See In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d 919 (1973), aff'd
sub nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The FCC obviously excerpted extensively to show that the sexually explicit language was not a
fleeting word or phrase. The key issue, however, becomes whether the FCC should be able to
focus on a limited number of exchanges in making its indecency determination. A reading of
only the sexually explicit portions of James Joyce's "Uylsses" certainly would place it within
the same category as the FCC has placed "The Jerker.".
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its program, despite its strong language, was of public interest to the
homosexual community in Los Angeles. 7  The station asserted that
"The Jerker" dealt with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), and in that context, strong language was needed to highlight
the need to champion life in the face of death. 79 KPFK-FM further
argued that the FCC did not properly consider the context of the lan-
guage when it decided that the play's language was patently offen-
sive."s Thus, the station believed that the whole program must be
considered rather than episodic statements. Additionally, in an effort
to comply with the FCC's advice in earlier cases, KPFK-FM aired a
listener warning prior to the broadcast.' Finally, KPFK-FM
asserted that there was little chance of children being in the listening
audience, which was confirmed by its Arbitron ratings. 8 2 The FCC
rejected KPFK-FM's arguments and concluded that the excerpts
from "The Jerker" were indecent, regardless of the play's seriousness
because of "the patently offensive manner in which the sexual activity
was described."' s The FCC only issued a warning, stating that prior
agency decisions might have led the radio station to believe that the
broadcast was permissible after 10 p.m.'8 4
The second complaint embodied in Action concerned station
WYSP-FM, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, which is licensed to Infinity
Broadcasting of Pennsylvania.8 5 The FCC received three complaints
about a morning show hosted by announcer Howard Stern. 8 6 Stem's
morning program originated at Infinity's co-owned station in New
178. Id. at 2698.
179. Id.
180. Id. The FCC also had received a complaint on July 10, 1986, alleging that on June 28,
1986, at approximately 7:45 p.m., local time, KPFK aired a program entitled "Shocktime
America," which allegedly contained a narration and song lyrics with such phrases and words
as "eat shit," "mother fucker" and "fuck the U.S.A." Id. The complaint did not include a
transcript or tape recording of the show; and, therefore, the FCC refused to consider it. Id.
181. The warning broadcast by KPFK-FM stated:
The Supreme Court of the United States has directed that broadcasters must be
especially aware of the effect of the use of so called "indecent" language during
the hours when children may be listening. KPFK's policy is to allow the freest
possible expression consistent with that ruling. The following program contains
material which some listeners may find objectionable. If you would be disturbed
by the use of such sensitive material, please tune out for the next ...... minutes.
Id. at 2698.
182. Id. Arbitron is a service that monitors the number of audience members for particular
programs. The service is used by broadcasters and advertisers.
183. Id. at 2700.
184. Id. at 2701.
185. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, 2 F.C.C. Rcd 2705 (April 29, 1987).
186. Donald E. Wildmon, National Federation for Decency, Tupelo, Mississippi, filed two
complaints on September 26 and November 6, 1986, respectively. Mary V. Keeley, of
Philadelphia, filed the third complaint on October 27, 1986. Id.
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York and was simulcast on WYSP-FM. During a particular broad-
cast excerpted by the FCC, Stern made repeated jokes with sexual
overtones and made references to sexual activities and organs.
187
Infinity contended that Stem's use of innuendo and double entendre
did not amount to a violation of the Carlin seven-dirty-words rule. 8
It further asserted that Stem's morning show involved a wide-ranging
discussion based on humor and satire that did not, on the whole,
reach the realm of patent offensiveness.18 9
In deciding Infinity, the FCC found that the various sexually ori-
ented topics discussed on the Stern program were not per se "beyond
the realm of acceptable broadcast discussion." 190 The FCC con-
cluded, however, that the programs contained patently offensive
material because of the manner in which Stern presented it.191 The
187. The FCC's opinion cited the following excerpts:
Excerpt 1
Howard Stem: "God, my testicles are like down to the floor. Boy, Susan,
you could really have a party with these. I'm telling you honey."
Ray: "Use them like Bocci balls."
Excerpt 2
Howard Stern: "Let me tell you something, honey. Those homos you are
with are all limp."
Ray: "Yeah. You've never even had a real man."
Howard Stem: "You've probably never been with a man with a full
erection."
Excerpt 3
Susan: "No. I was in a park in New Rochelle, N.Y."
Howard Stem: "In a park in New Rochelle? On your knees?"
Susan: "No. no."
Ray: "And squeezing someone's testicles, probably."
Excerpt 4
Talking to a caller[.]
Howard Stem: "I'd ask your penis size and stuff like that, but I really don't
care."
Excerpt 5
As part of a discussion of lesbians[:]
Howard Stem: "I mean to go around porking other girls with vibrating
rubber products and they want the whole world to come to a standstill."
Excerpt 6
Howard Stem: "Have you ever had sex with an animal?"
Caller: "No."
Howard Stem: "Well, don't knock it. I was sodomized by Lambchop, you
know that puppet Sherri Lewis holds? ... Baaaaah. That's where I was thinking
that Sherri Lewis, instead of like sodomizing all the people at the Academy to get
that shot on the Emmys she could've had Lambehop do it."
Id. at 2706.
188. Id. at 2705.
189. Id. A distinction was made between vulgarities and patently offensive language;
however, the court never explained the distinction or its importance. Id.
190. Id. at 2706.
191. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 211, 217
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FCC found that, because WYSP-FM aired the material during morn-
ing hours, there was a reasonable risk that children were in the audi-
ence.'92 As in the case involving KPFK-FM, the FCC only issued a
warning. 193
The third and final Action complaint involved KCSB-FM, Santa
Barbara, California, which is licensed to the University of Califor-
nia.194  During a music program aired after 10 p.m., KCSB-FM
broadcast a song entitled "Makin' Bacon," which included graphic
suggestions of sexual activity.195 Finding the lyrics of "Makin'
Bacon" patently offensive, the FCC held that the broadcast of the
(Dec. 29, 1987) (reconsideration order). The FCC agreed that much of the material was
merely innuendo and double entendre, and neither patently offensive nor indecent, but some
portions of the broadcasts could not meet this characterization. Id. at 217. These portions:
consisted of vulgar and lewd references to the male genitals and to masturbation
and sodomy broadcast in the context of what we described, and which has not
been disputed, as 'explicit references to masturbation, ejaculation, breast size,
penis size, sexual intercourse, nudity, urination, oral-genital contact, erections,
sodomy, bestiality, menstruation and testicles.'
Id. (footnote omitted).
192. The FCC noted that the programs "did not contain merely an occasional off-color
reference or expletive, but instead dwelt on sexual and excretory matters in a pandering and
titillating fashion indicat[ing] that children who may have randomly tuned into them would
have likely continued to listen." Id.
193. Id. at 2701.
194. In re Regents of the University of California, 2 F.C.C. Red 2703 (1987).
195. The FCC's opinion included this excerpt:
Makin' bacon, makin' bacon, makin' bacon, makin' bacon
[inaudible]
A ten-inch cropper with a varicose vein
Makin' bacon is on my mind
Come here baby, make it quick,
Kneel down there and suck on my dick
Makin' bacon is on my mind
Makin' bacon is on my mind
Turn around baby, let me take you from behind,
Makin' bacon is on my mind.
With your blue, blue knickers, you look so neat,
Bend over baby, gonna give you my meat,
Makin' bacon is on my mind.
Get down baby on your hands and knees
Take my danish and give it a squeeze
Makin' bacon is on my mind
Makin' bacon is on my mind
Turn around baby, let me take you from behind
Makin' bacon is on my mind.
Hey baby, got something to chew
Deep throat, baby, it's good for you
Makin' bacon is on my mind.
Makin' bacon is on my mind
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song violated the indecency standards because it contained lewd and
graphic references that rendered any purported innuendo or double
entendre in the remainder of the song to be of a sexual meaning.
196
As in the two Action cases before it, the University of California
received only a warning based on its ignorance of the new standard. 197
B. Court of Appeals Review
The broadcasters cited in the three complaints, joined by citizen
groups, successfully petitioned the FCC for reconsideration of the
actions,1 98 but in the rehearing, the FCC reaffirmed the generic stan-
dard.1 99 The FCC emphasized, however, that the subject matter
alone does not render material indecent;2°0 rather, it must be
presented in a manner that is patently offensive.20 1 This, of course,
offered little in making the standard for indecent speech more con-
crete. The FCC, however, backed off its initial claim that no standard
time could be set for deciding when children were likely to be in the
audience, suggesting that midnight was a proper time after which
indecent programming could be aired.20 2
Turn around baby, let me take you from behind
Makin' bacon is on my mind.
Id.
196. The court stated:
As noted in Infinity Broadcasting Corp. and Pacifica Foundation, also decided
today, prior Commission rulings have applied the Pacifica definition of indecency
in a manner that requires clarification. We find that this broadcast made several
clearly discernible references to sexual organs and activities, and that these
references are patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium. In addition, as we noted in Infinity,
innuendo can be, and in this case is, rendered explicit by surrounding explicit
references that make the meaning of the entire discussion clear. Although the
material aired does not involve the specific seven words at issue in the Pacifica
case, we find that it would be actionable under our clarified definition of
indecency set forth today.
Id. at 2703-04 (footnotes omitted).
197. Id. at 2704. In June 1988, the FCC, by a 2-1 vote, took action against Media Central's
KZKC-TV, Kansas City, Missouri, for broadcasting a film the Commission deemed to be
indecent. Brief Section, BROADCASTING, July 1, 1988, at 10. A $2,000 fine was imposed
making KZKC-TV the first television station to be fined for indecency. Id. The station had
broadcast the film "Private Lessons" during prime time in May 1987. Id.
198. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 211 (Dec.
29, 1987) (reconsideration order). Morality in Media filed opposing comments. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 217.
202. Commissioner Patricia Diaz Dennis concurred, but disagreed with the FCC's
purported adoption of midnight as a "safe harbor." Id. at 220. She stated that the FCC's
adoption of midnight was unclearly stated dicta. Id. Diaz further found that "after stating
why an adjudicatory matter is not the vehicle for defining the critical hour after which
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The broadcasters and citizens groups then petitioned the D.C.
Circuit for review of the FCC's decision. 203 The D.C. Circuit upheld
the generic definition of indecency, but found that the FCC did not
adequately justify its more restrictive channeling of indecent broad-
casts into night hours.2°  Although the court affirmed the FCC's
declaratory warning order against the Howard Stern morning pro-
gram, it vacated the FCC's orders regarding the two programs aired
after 10 p.m. 205 The court remanded those two cases to the FCC with
instructions to reopen the channeling aspect of the rulings.2° The
court specifically asked the FCC to consider whether the speech at
issue had any first amendment protection, and if the FCC's objective
was to assist parents and not to become a censor.20 7
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF ACTION WITH COMPARISONS TO PACIFICA
A. Generic Indecency
In sum, if acceptance of the FCC's generic definition of "inde-
cent" as capable of surviving a vagueness challenge is not implicit
indecent material may be broadcast, [the majority] discuss[es] the merits of adopting a 12:00
midnight hour." Id.
Diaz also wrote that:
At stake are important constitutional issues and equally important societal
values. Indecent speech is protected by the first amendment. On the other hand,
the compelling government interest in protecting the welfare of children obligates
us to channel the time, place, and manner of indecent speech so there is no
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience. Yet, to avoid chilling
broadcasters' speech by subjecting them to a vague or overbroad standard, we
must be as specific as possible in describing how such speech should be
channelled. The least we could have done was to establish a time certain after
which indecent material may be channelled.
Id.
Diaz ultimately proposed a post-prime time hour as the "safe harbor" for airing indecent
broadcasts. Id. at 221. This, she suggested would be either 10 or 11 p.m., depending on the
community. Id. at 220. Weekend nights would require a midnight starting point. Id. at 221.
She cited Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1956), for the proposition that time, place, and
manner restrictions imposed to advance the government and societal interests in protecting the
welfare of children cannot reduce adult programming to the level of what is fit only for chil-
dren. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 220.
203. Action For Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Media Central, Inc., and the National Federation
of Community Broadcasters intervened in support of the petitioners. Id. Monroe
Communications Corporation intervened in support of the FCC. Id.
204. Id. at 1334-35.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1334.
207. Id.
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in Pacifica, we have misunderstood Higher Authority and welcome
correction.
Judge Ruth B. Ginsburg
20 8
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that Action involved a considera-
ble expansion of the rule set out before the Supreme Court in
Pacifica.2°9 Where Pacifica addressed a single, narrowly focused FCC
order, the court found that Action presented much broader policy
considerations.2 10 As such, a different judicial response was
required. 21 1 The court stated that the FCC used an informal adjudi-
cation format to promulgate a rule of general applicability. 2 2 The
court concluded that the FCC may not resort to adjudication as a
means of insulating a generic standard from judicial review.213
The broadcasters and citizens groups focused their argument on
the vagueness and overbreadth of the indecency standard.21 4 They
contended that the FCC virtually had unlimited discretion in defining
the material that could be proscribed, which in effect made the Com-
mission a censor.21 5 In response to the petitioners' vagueness argu-
ment, the court held that the nature of indecent language did not
allow a more specific definition.21 6 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the
FCC-with little explanation-that the seven-word standard was not
208. Id. at 1339.
209. Id. at 1337. The FCC had urged the D.C. Circuit to review nothing more than the
three specific FCC holdings declaring material 'indecent as broadcast' as the Supreme Court
had in Pacifica. Id. at 1336. Thus the court only would have considered whether the
programs were indecent, and, if so, whether they were aired at a time when children may have
been in the audience. Id. at 1337. The court rejected this approach. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1336.
212. Id. at 1337.
213. Id.
214. Brief for Petitioners at 32, Action, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1064).
215. Action, 852 F.2d at 18. When Congress adopted the indecency section of the
Communications Act, which eventually became Section 326, it failed to explain the intended
meaning or scope of the indecency prohibition. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 49 (1934); S. Doc. No. 200, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1927); S. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1926).
216. The D.C. Circuit quoted with approval from Judge Leventhal's dissent in Pacifica
Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. 1977). Action, 852 F.2d at 1338. Judge Leventhal
stated:
It is appropriate to acknowledge some inexactness in the agency's approach, and
to say that this is an abiding discomfort but not a brand of invalidity. Vagueness
is to some extent inherent in the subject matter, and is heightened by a
procedure, of rulings in particular instances, that presents problems but also has
virtues. The Supreme Court's long struggle with obscenity cases reflects the
underlying complexities, and those cases involved criminal sanctions. Nor is
regulation of indecency precluded by the administrative agency setting. Miller
[Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)] has language that features the value of a
finding by a jury representing the community. Yet Miller's continuation of an
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sufficient to protect children from patently offensive material,217 and
therefore the FCC's generic definition was the best alternative.
2 8
Additionally, the court stated that "the generic definition now
employed by the FCC is virtually the same definition the Commission
articulated in the order reviewed by the Supreme Court in the Pacifica
case.
219
The D.C. Circuit's reference to Pacifica amounts to an oversim-
plification of the Supreme Court's treatment of indecency. Justice
Stevens, in his Pacifica plurality opinion, stated that the Court's
"review is limited to the question of whether the Commission has the
authority to proscribe the particular broadcast. '221 Stevens also
noted that "questions concerning possible action in other contexts
were expressly reserved for the future," 22' and he declined to consider
the broader question of the constitutionality of the standard.222 This
language demonstrates that the Court did not consider a broad inde-
cency standard, although it had every opportunity to do So.
2 2 3
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit's decision neglected to detail the
role that broadcast context plays in determining indecency. 224 The
FCC stated that the context will be important, but it did not elaborate
on this point.225 In other words, the context in which an indecent
remark is made is an indeterminate variable in an FCC equation that
offers no benchmark by which broadcasters can measure their actions.
Under this approach, broadcasters are given no meaningful direction
to evaluate the relative values of content and form in broadcasting.226
obscenity exception to freedom of press has been approved in other cases where
there was no criminal prosecution and no jury.
Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 35 (Leventhal, C.J., dissenting).
217. Action, 852 F.2d at 1338.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 742 (1978).
221. Id. at 734.
222. Id. at 742-43.
223. Justice Powell, in concurrence, agreed that the Court appropriately had refused to
consider the overbreadth challenge because the Commission's order was limited to the facts of
the case. Id. at 761 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 40.
225. Public Notice, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1218, 1219 (April 29, 1987) ("IT]he context in
which the allegedly indecent language is broadcast will serve as an important factor in
determining whether it is, in fact, indecent.").
226. In a footnote to his Pacifica opinion, Justice Stevens stated: "A requirement that
indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the content,
of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use
of less offensive language." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 n. 18. Taken on its face, Stevens creates an
odd conception of the first amendment in which a person's thoughts are protected until uttered
in a manner that might offend some people.
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The Howard Stern program, broadcast on WYSP-FM, was a top-
rated program in the Philadelphia radio market.227 The inescapable
conclusion is that someone was interested in the message relayed by
Stern.228 The court's failure to explain why Stem's joking references
to sex are any more patently offensive than the occasional utterance of
a four-letter word or explicit discussion of sex on a "serious" talk
show further muddles the definition of indecency. The court should
be required to state explicitly the interests at stake, and then discuss
how it arrived at the weights it used to balance those interests. Sim-
ply saying that certain material may be harmful to children has no
basis in reason or logic. The court must first state what the relevant
ages of the child audience are and how the material may be harmful
to them. Then it must give some weight to the first amendment rights
of the broadcasters and discuss why those rights are outweighed by
the interests of children.229
B. The Channeling Rationale
The D.C. Circuit remanded two of the three FCC orders that
concerned programming after 10 p.m.2a° In so doing, the court
rejected the FCC's position that "safe harbors" should encompass dif-
ferent time periods across the nation.231 Irrespective of the D.C. Cir-
cuit's concern about channeling, however, the FCC ultimately
adopted a twenty-four-hour ban on indecency in December 1988.232
The expansive ban directly resulted from congressional pressure in the
form of a directive attached to the FCC's budget appropriations.233
The recent action directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's ration-
ale for regulating indecency in Pacifica, as well as the court's concerns
in Action. FCC Chairman Dennis Patrick did not overlook this fact
when he said that the expanded ban of indecency appeared to be
unconstitutional. 
234
Thus the safe harbor issue remains in flux and is likely to be back
in court. The FCC argues that, at a minimum, the need to protect
children justifies the channeling of indecent broadcasts, although
227. Indecency: Radio's sound, FCC's fury, BROADCASTING, June 22, 1987 at 46-49
(Stem's show produced enough mail to fill five folders at the FCC.).
228. Id.
229. See infra Section V.
230. Action, 852 F.2d at 1334.
231. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 211, 219
n.47 (Dec. 29, 1987).
232. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency, 65
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1038 (Dec. 23, 1988).
233. See 134 CONG. REC. § 9912 (daily ed. July 26, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
234. Enforcement of Prohibitions, 65 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1039.
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Pacifica could be read to include the protection of vulnerable
adults.2 35  Proponents of FCC control in this area argue that radio
and television intrude so easily into the home that parents cannot con-
trol what their children are exposed to.2 36 This argument, however,
ignores the desire of some parents to expose their children to material
that the FCC might consider indecent.237 Furthermore, some argue
that the pervasive nature of broadcasting is, in fact, a good reason to
present more than a limited number of morally backed viewpoints.238
The problem in creating an indecent speech "safe harbor" is
analogous to the controls on morally offensive printed material that
might be distributed to children.2 39  In order to successfully create
such a "safe harbor," the FCC must establish strict standards that
allow adults access to this type of material. 2" In Action, the D.C.
Circuit remanded the "safe harbor" cases to the FCC with instruc-
tions to carefully tailor the channeling approach to assist parents
without unnecessary censorship. 241 The court stated that, when possi-
ble, programs that might offend children should be broadcast late at
night with warnings so that parents properly can supervise their chil-
dren.242 Undoubtedly, some youths will be awake when such broad-
casts might be aired, but the numbers that are subject to legitimate
government concern will be significantly lowered.
243
Any channeling approach ultimately fails, however, for the same
reason that regulating indecency with the current generic standard is
235. In its 1960 Programming Policy Statement, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960), the FCC asserted:
We recognize that the broadcasting medium presents problems peculiar to itself
which are not necessarily subject to the same rules governing other media of
communication. As we stated... 'radio and TV programs enter the home and
are readily available not only to the average normal adult but also to children
and to the emotionally immature. Thus, for example, while a nudist magazine
may be within the protection of the first amendment the televising of nudes might
well raise a serious question of programming contrary to 18 U.S.C. 1464.'
Id. at 2307.
236. See Brief for Intervenor Monroe Communications Corporation at 7, Action For
Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1064).
237. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 769-70 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
238. See Eastern Educational Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408; cf Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463, 489-91 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
239. In Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), the Court held unconstitutional a state law
that prohibited the sale of any books containing immoral language or pictures tending to
corrupt the morals of youth. Id. at 384. The Court found that the statute, designed
presumably to protect children, denied adults access to constitutionally protected materials.
Id. at 383-84. Such a quarantine on general distribution would, in the context of Butler, "burn
the house and roast the pig." Id. at 383.
240. Brief for Petitioners at 40, Action, supra note 214 (No. 88-1064).
241. Action, 852 F.2d at 1334.
242. Id. at 1343-44.
243. See Brief for Petitioners at 40, Action, supra note 214 (No. 88-1064).
[Vol. 43:871
REGULATION OF BROADCAST INDECENCY
inadequate. In order to channel indecency, it still must be readily
identifiable. If the channeling approach will ever work properly, the
type of show in which the indecency airs, the time it airs, and the
likelihood that a child might listen to it should be considered in mea-
suring indecency. Then the FCC could more properly establish the
"safe harbor."
V. DEFINING INDECENCY AND THE CHILLING EFFECT ON FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Thus far in the discussion it has been apparent that the FCC and
courts act under the assumption that broadcast programming, and
not material in other media, may be held to a different standard for
two reasons: first, the uniquely pervasive quality of the medium; and
second, the detrimental effect that some material can have on
unsupervised children, which outweighs the substantial first amend-
ment interests of broadcasters and interested audience members.
A. The Differences Between Broadcast and Other Media
Justice Stevens, in Pacifica, concluded that because broadcasting
is pervasive in the home and accessible to children, it presents special
first amendment problems that require different treatment than is
required for other media.2" Justices Powell and Blackmun consid-
ered this perfunctory rationale sufficient to join the majority, which
held that the FCC may constitutionally regulate indecent, nonobscene
broadcasting.245 This rationale, however, appears to be increasingly
implausible, particularly with the advent of cable television and the
increasing availability of printed materials. For the purposes of this
discussion, radio is compared to books, magazines, and newspapers;
and broadcast television is compared to cable television-although
the arguments in each area overlap for the most part.
1. RADIO
Radio is no more an "intruder" into a home than a newspaper or
a magazine, both of which operate under no indecency standards.246
In fact, newspapers and magazines are more accessible to youths, who
can freely purchase or peruse them at any comer convenience store.247
Moreover, printed material arguably is more intrusive on parental
244. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747-50.
245. Id. at 757-59.
246. Id. at 748. In Pacifica, Justice Stevens reasoned that radio was an "intruder" in the
home and thereby required different treatment. Id.
247. The annual SPORTS ILLUSTRATED swimsuit issue, which contains partial nudity, is the
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control because it tends to be more permanent and can be used in a
more secretive manner. Unlike broadcasts, improper language in
print can be indefinitely reviewed, which could lead to more episodic
rereading of indecent material. Broadcast, by contrast, requires tap-
ing a program for review, a procedure that is considerably more "pub-
lic" than hiding a book under a pillow or reading it in a basement.
Certainly the argument can be made that a Walkman, or any portable
radio, places broadcast outside the area of parental control. But it is
still the parent who must approve of a child possessing one of these
types of radios.
2. TELEVISION
Courts have found that cable television, like printed material, is
worthy of more constitutional protection than broadcast television.2 41
Cable operators generally have functioned under a municipal
franchise awarded through a competitive bidding process. 249 Efforts
to restrict indecency on cable television have involved local ordi-
nances or contractual provisions in the franchise agreement, which
sometimes are backed by similar state statutes.250
The physical properties of broadcasting and cable, however, have
many similarities. Electromagnetic radiation distributes both,
although broadcast signals are transmitted through space and cable
signals travel through wires. Nevertheless, the argument is made that
a major distinction exists in the different ownership of the means by
which signals are transmitted. 1 Under this distinction, it is proper
to regulate broadcasting because the airwaves are owned by the pub-
lic, while wires are owned by cable operators. By this logic, however,
cable television could be regulated because wires are run through the
magazine's most successful issue of the year. See Hot Issue, Miami Herald, Feb. 7, 1989, at
Dl.
248. See Community Television v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah), aff'd, Jones v.
Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987). The district court held
that a Utah statute that barred the showing of "indecent material" on cable television systems
was overbroad. Id. at 1117. Although the legislature could constitutionally bar "obscene"
material, the court reasoned that some "indecent material" is not "obscene," and thus the
statute barred material that is protected by the first amendment, as well as unprotected
material. Id.
249. See Winer, The Signal Cable Sends, Part If-Interference From The Indecency Cases?,
55 FORDHAM. L. REV. 459, 504 (1987).
250. A description of federal regulation in this area can be found in the 1984 Cable Act, 47
U.S.C. §§ 529-559 (Supp. IV 1986).
251. See Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio
and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 152 (1967) (Public ownership of the
broadcast spectrum is logically meaningless, since it lacks the characteristics of property that
can be owned.).
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public right of way.25 2 Furthermore, independent companies produce
the majority of programming distributed by cable operators, and
those programs are transmitted via satellite or by microwave relay
stations to the operators.253 Thus, the distribution of cable program-
ming relies on the same "public" airwaves as broadcasting. 254 The
only difference is that a step is added-local cable operators-to the
process.
The obvious retort to the assertion that broadcasting and cable
possess similar physical properties is that one must be a subscriber to
receive cable programming.255 Yet, as long as individuals have free
will and are not required to purchase a television set, the reception of
broadcast airwaves also involves the free choice of consumers. In
each case, a viewer must purchase equipment to receive the benefit of
what is transmitted through the airwaves. Broadcast signals are no
more intrusive into the homes of television owners than satellite trans-
missions are intrusive into the homes of satellite dish owners.
Parents arguably may limit cable viewing by purchasing
lockboxes or parental discretion units (PDU), but few parents who
are cable subscribers actually use such devices,256 and lockboxes are
available for broadcast television as well.25 7 There also are other tech-
nological advances that could give parents more control over the pro-
grams available to their children.258  Consequently, broader
regulation for broadcast is not justified simply because the alternative
of less regulation requires new but available technological methods. 259
252. See Winer, supra note 249, at 459, 512-13.
253. Id. at 513.
254. Id.
255. Id.; see also Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1167
(D. Utah 1982).
256. See Community Television v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah), aff'd, Jones v.
Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986) (The Utah Attorney General argued that, although
cable subscribers were advised of the availability of lockboxes either free or for less than $20,
fewer than 1% of the cable company subscribers chose to obtain this equipment.), aff'd, 480
U.S. 926 (1987).
257. Similar to the cable television lockbox, or parental discretion unit ("PDU"), which
allow parents to lock out particular channels likely to contain material they do not want their
children to see, public broadcast discretion devices have been created. See, e.g., Sony Trinitron
Color Television 1988 (brochure available from Sony Corporation of America, Sony Drive,
Park Ridge, New Jersey, 07656). Fourteen of twenty-four Sony television models offer devices
that allow channels to be blocked out. Id.; see also General Electric, Inc., (Command
Performance (TM) Series television sets) Pub. No. 76-4036, (available from General Electric's
Video Products Business Division, Portsmouth, VA 23705). These new devices contain timing
systems that allow a parent to block out designated channels, including those for playback of
recorded material.
258. See Winer, supra note 249, at 459, 516-19 (1987).
259. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently rejected the FCC's
efforts to regulate dial-a-porn through time-channeling or access code provisions because the
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Ultimately, because technology equally could be used for cable and
broadcast, the real question becomes the supervision and control that
adults exercise over the viewing and listening habits of their children.
B. The Child Audience and Indecency
The idea that children require special protection from indecency
emanates from the premise that freedom of speech requires a degree
of maturity, intellect, and self-control on the audience's part. 260 Thus,
governmental intervention is necessary if the audience lacks any of
these qualifications. 26  The vulnerable audience concept has common
sense value, but, particularly in the area of indecency, it easily can
inspire expansive regulation to protect what essentially could be
defined as a limitless interest.262 The most interesting problem raised
by the child audience is that children are incapable of understanding
some of the indecent material from which they are being protected.
The argument could be made, particularly in regard to innuendo or
double entendre, that certain indecent references are beyond the
understanding of young children. Along these lines, perhaps the
major problem for broadcasters has been defining the child audience
itself. Certain phrases and descriptions that might be readily under-
stood as indecent to a nine-year-old might be beyond the understand-
ing of a four-year-old and innocuous to a seventeen-year-old. The
courts and the FCC have given little guidance in this area, although
the Commission recently has suggested that the definitional age of
"children" should be twelve years old.263
The government claims a legitimate interest in the development
of children, and thereby the materials available to them.264 Because
FCC failed to adequately consider less restrictive means that were technically and
economically feasible, such as new ways of selectively screening or blocking such reception.
See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 855-57 (2d Cir. 1986); Carlin
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1984).
260. H. KALVEN, supra note 143, at 54-55.
261. Id. at 54.
262. Id. at 55.
263. A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at 29. FCC General Counsel Diane Killory suggested that
the definitional age for children would be shifted from eighteen to twelve-years old for the
purposes of determining indecency. Id.
264. In Pacifica, Justice Stevens suggested that indecency could also be banned because
some adults would not be able to avoid offensive words as they were switching through radio
channels. 438 U.S. at 748-49. Although Stevens suggested that vulnerable adults needed
protection, he also suggested that indecency could be broadcast in the late evenings hours
when certainly some of those adults might still be listening. Id. at 750. Thus it appears
Stevens contradicted his own argument. Furthermore, Stevens gave no support for the
premise that broadcast should be held to the moral level of the most vulnerable people in
society.
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indecent speech does not reach the level of obscenity, the govern-
ment's interest in regulating such speech lies in its authority to aid
parents' efforts in raising and educating their children.265 Contrasting
the problem of protecting children, the Court consistently has main-
tained that it is improper to reduce the adult population to viewing
and reading only what is appropriate for children.266 The problem
squarely becomes how to protect children without completely abridg-
ing the first amendment rights of adult listeners and broadcasters.
Completely banning indecency eliminates protected communica-
tion.26 7 Restricting indecency to late evening and early morning
hours, as suggested in Pacifica, also substantially intrudes on the
rights of both programmers and viewers by effectively precluding pro-
tected expression during the hours when most adults are awake. 268 It
becomes obvious when one considers the polarized interests at stake
that it is impossible for government to make a concrete regulation
that would single out the youthful portion of the viewing and listening
audience without substantially encroaching on the constitutional
rights of adults.
In the home, however, parents are in a better position to make
individualized judgments regarding household viewing habits of both
sexual material and graphic violence. 269 The Supreme Court long has
deferred to a parent's right to control the development and upbring-
ing of his children.270 Thus, parental control is not only the most
effective method, but the most protective of first amendment rights.
There is therefore no basis for distinguishing between cable television
and broadcasting, or between print and radio, for indecency regula-
tion because parental authority can be exercised in each medium.
265. Id. at 728; see also Note, Morality and the Broadcast Media: A Constitutional Analysis
of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1971).
266. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). In Butler, the defendant was
convicted of making published material available to the general public that might have a
deleterious influence on youth. Id. at 383. The court held that reducing the adult public to
reading material that was suitable for children was overbroad and would amount to "burn[ing]
the house to roast the pig." Id. at 384.
267. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 770-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. See Community Television v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1117 (D. Utah), aff'd,
Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
269. Id. at 1117.
270. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972) (Parents may remove
children from public school if continued attendance would substantially infringe on legitimate
religious beliefs.); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("The prohibition against
sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their
children.").
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VI. OVERBREADTH, VAGUENESS, AND THE CHILLING EFFECT27 1
Even if the FCC's argument regarding the uniqueness of broad-
casting is accepted, it seems odd that the scrupulous adherence to the
protection of first amendment values would be discarded. The FCC's
generic standard offers no guidance for defining which suggestive
material is "patently offensive." The vagueness inherent in the inde-
cency standard gives the FCC unbridled discretion to choose which
first amendment values it will permit.
A. The Overbreadth and Vagueness of a Generic Standard
The vagueness problem that might invalidate a piece of legisla-
tion often accompanies overbreadth, but the two concepts are not
identical. A law is overbroad if it is overinclusively drafted to pro-
scribe expressive conduct that is beyond the government's constitu-
tional authority.272 Furthermore, an overbroad law often is void on
its face and need not be attacked as applied to the particular facts of a
case. 2 7  Facial invalidation is appropriate for overbroad laws with
two characteristics.2 74 First, the overbreadth must be substantial, and
the protected speech must be a significant part of the law's "target
area." 275 Second, it must not be possible to excise the unconstitu-
tional applications of the overbroad law.27 6 If, however, a court can
adopt a limiting construction that omits unconstitutional applications
the law is not overbroad.277 Similarly, the doctrine of vagueness voids
a statute that defines forbidden conduct so unclearly that persons "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
271. The chilling effect stands for the proposition that the very existence of the legal rule in
question will cause would-be speakers to shy away from the legitimate exercise of their first
amendment rights because they will fear the possibility of either criminal or civil liability. See
Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 762 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
272. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
273. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 852
(1970). The author stated:
[The overbreadth doctrine] results often in the wholesale invalidation of the
legislature's handiwork, creating a judicial-legislative confrontation. In the end,
this departure from the normal method of judging the constitutionality of
statutes must find justification in the favored status of rights to expression and
association in the constitutional scheme.
Id. at 852.
274. L. TRIBE, supra note 92, § 12-27, to -28, at 1022-24.
275. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (Upholding, without dissent, a criminal
conviction under a state statute that prohibited the distribution of depictions of sexual
performances by children under the age of sixteen.).
276. Id.
277. L. TRIBE, supra note 92, § 12-28, at 1024.
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as to its application. 2 78  In the first amendment area, an unduly
vague statute has the same chilling effect on speech as does an over-
broad one: one does not know whether his conduct is constitutionally
protected, so he declines to exercise his right of speech.
2 79
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines evidence the Supreme
Court's grave concern for the protection of first amendment values
and the avoidance of "chilling" protected speech.2 80 In Miller v. Cali-
fornia,28 1 the Court attempted to further clarify the definition of
obscenity by requiring that state statutes be "carefully limited," so as
not to intrude upon legitimate expression.282 Although Miller by no
means completely answered the question of specificity in obscenity, it
did require that material be considered as a whole and that patently
offensive activity should be specifically defined by law.283 In Commu-
nity Television v. Wilkinson,24 a federal district court held a Utah
cable indecency statute overbroad and vague because it failed to
account for Miller's variable community standard and to consider the
work as a whole. 285 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
holding.28 6
The FCC's generic standard suffers from the infirmities of over-
breadth and vagueness. Consider the new standard's three compo-
nent parts: 1) language or material that depicts or describes sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner; 2) as
278. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
279. The main difference between overbreadth and vagueness is that vagueness is "latent."
See Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States, 92 HARV. L. REV. 15 (1979) (Both areas
require that there be uncertainty about which applications of a statute constitutionally may be
imposed.).
280. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 852-58
(1970).
281. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
282. Id. at 23-24.
283. See supra note 19.
284. 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah), aff'd, Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986),
aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987).
285. 611 F. Supp. at 1110.
286. 480 U.S. 926 (1987); see also Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (The Court
vacated and remanded a conviction under a statute barring obscene and lascivious language in
any public place or in the presence of females.); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913
(1972) (The Court vacated and remanded a conviction under a breach of peace statute
prohibiting offensive speech.); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (The Court
summarily vacated and remanded a conviction under a disorderly persons statute prohibiting
the use of offensive, profane, or indecent language in a public place.); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) (The Court invalidated a state law that found Cohen guilty for printing a four-
letter word on his jacket.); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 59 (1963) (The Court
held unconstitutional a state law creating a commission that was to "educate the public
concerning [materials] containing obscene, indecent or impure language, or manifestly tending
to the corruption of youths.").
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measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium; and 3) is broadcast at a time when there is a reasonable risk
that children would be in the audience.
28 7
It is important to note, as evidenced in Pacifica, that the use of a
patently offensive word is not always improper.28 8 Accordingly, pat-
ent offensiveness must be judged by some metaphysical standard
whereby only repeated use of indecent words or phrases meets the
generic test.289 Furthermore, innuendo and double entendre are not
categorically indecent, which only can mean that such words or
phrases are protected speech. Yet, the generic standard does not
make a distinction for protected and unprotected patently offensive
phrases. The FCC, in a 1976 legislative proposal for a new law regu-
lating indecency, conceded that, short of defining a recognizable cate-
gory of expression as unprotected, a generic standard probably would
be overbroad and vague. 29  The FCC's current definition, however,
conflicts with the Miller requirements for obscenity and the Commis-
sion's own fears of overbreadth and vagueness.291
Although limited by the Supreme Court in recent years, facial
invalidation is the appropriate cure for the "chilling effect" created by
overbroad laws.292 The generic standard, as it stands, is impermissi-
bly overbroad because it does not distinguish how the use of indecent
words or phrases magically becomes patently offensive. Thus it chills
protected speech and is vague because it is not possible to distinguish
which patently offensive phrases are protected and which are not
protected.
287. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 62 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1218, 1219 (Dec. 29, 1987).
288. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.
289. Id.
290. In re Pacifica Foundation Station, WBAI-FM, 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 98 (1975).
291. Id. at 98 (literary and artistic merit may be considered for evening broadcasts). First,
the FCC urges that its standard for indecency is part of the Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), test for obscenity and hence constitutional. Infinity Broadcasting, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) at 216. Although the FCC's "patently offensive" standard for indecency is similar to the
second part of the three-part test for obscenity articulated by the Supreme Court in Miller,
there is an important difference. See supra note 19. Under Miller, the reach of the "patently
offensive" part of the test is significantly narrowed because material must satisfy all three parts
of the test to be obscene, including the requirements of appeal to prurient interest and the
absence of serious merit when the work is considered as a whole. Id.
The FCC's notion of indecency, by contrast, is not limited by a requirement of prurient
interest, nor does it consider serious merit a defense to a charge of indecency. Id. Taken
alone, as the FCC has done in its new indecency standard, the "patently offensive" part of the
Miller test is so sweeping that it amounts to a wholesale license to proscribe material. Infinity
Broadcasting, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 211.
292. See generally Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1981).
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B. A Proper Chill?
The FCC concedes that broadcasters are "chilled" by its new
standard, but it argues that this is "not an inappropriate chill"
293
because it falls only on indecent speech. This last point is difficult to
verify, but it is clear that broadcasters, who must petition the FCC
periodically for renewal of their licenses, will refrain from broadcast-
ing material that may be "decent. ' 294  As a result, constitutionally
protected material that may be controversial will be withheld. 29 ' As
Justice Marshall stated in Arnett v. Kennedy,296 an overbroad statute
"hangs over [people's] heads like a Sword of Damocles .... That this
Court will ultimately vindicate [a person] if his speech is constitution-
ally protected is of little consequence-for the value of a sword of
Damocles is that it hangs-not that it drops. ' 297 By articulating an
inherently boundless standard, the FCC effectively has positioned
itself as a "Sword of Damocles"-a censor free to forbid whatever is
objectionable to "the most vocal and powerful of orthodoxies.
298
Given that the FCC particularly is vulnerable to political pressure,
the impetus to follow a centrist-orientation makes the Commission a
poor arbiter of first amendment rights.299
Ironically, the FCC's concern with the anomalous effects created
by a bright-line rule that found only certain words indecent, has
developed a case-by-case method of discovering indecency that results
in equal but opposite anomalous effects-with first amendment rights
as the loser. In April 1988, the FCC, in an effort to further clarify its
standard, dismissed indecency complaints against two television sta-
tions and three radio stations.3 "o FCC General Counsel Diane Kil-
293. Infinity Broadcasting, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 219 n.45.
294. License renewals for radio are required every seven years, while renewals for television
come up every five years. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (Supp. IV 1986).
295. See Indecency: Radio's sound, FCC's fury, BROADCASTING, June 22, 1987, at 46-49.
Howard Stem was told to tone down his show after the FCC crackdown. Id. at 48. Stem's
station also began to periodically run warnings regarding the tone of Stem's material. Id. In a
speech to New England broadcasters two weeks after the Pacifica decision was announced,
then FCC Chairman Charles D. Ferris tried to allay the fears of chilled speech by saying a
reoccurrence of the fact situation in that case was "about as likely to occur again as Haley's
Comet." Which Way the Wind Blows at the FCC After WBA1, BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978,
at 31-32. The speech was given to the New England Broadcasters Association in Boston,
Mass., on July 21, 1978. Id. at 31.
296. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
297. Id. at 231.
298. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952) (Provisions of the New
York Education Law that forbid the commercial showing of any motion picture without a
license and authorize denial of a license on a censor's conclusion that a film is "sacrilegious"
was held void as a prior restraint under the first and fourteenth amendments.).
299. L. POWE, supra note 35, at 55.
300. BROADCASTING, April 11, 1988, at 37-38. The action came in the form of letters, all
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lory said the dismissals demonstrated that the Commission was
"exercising a degree of care warranted by the first amendment." 30 '
These dismissals, however, do not clarify the indecency standard
in any meaningful way.30 2 For example, one complaint involved a sex
education show for children- entitled "Teen Sex, What About the
Kids."30 3 The show included a discussion of sex, using models of sex-
ual organs.304 The FCC refused to find this program patently offen-
sive because its producers did not make an effort to "shock" the
audience, and because it did not pander or titillate in any manner.30 5
The implication from this analysis is that one can talk explicitly about
sex, but not joke about it as "Shock Jock" Howard Stern did in his
dated April 7, 1988 and sent to the individuals who complained about the respective
broadcasts. Id.
301. Id. at 37.
302. The following is a list of the stations, the complaints, and the FCC responses from
BROADCASTING, April 11, 1988, at 37-38:
*WCET(TV) Hamilton, Ohio: a complaint was received about the noncommercial station's
broadcast of a segment of the film "Heimat" on Oct. 12, 1987, at 9:30 p.m. Id. at 37. It was
not acted upon because the complaint consisted of written descriptions of films, which could
not be judged as to patent offensiveness because a complete tape of the broadcasts was not
made available. Id. The FCC pointed out that in order to determine context, a full tape
recording or transcript of the broadcast must be made available. Id.
*WTMA(AM) Charleston, S.C.: North Charleston Mayor John E. Bourne complained that
on July 15, 1987, WTMA broadcast a political advertisement opposing his efforts to purchase
a clock for city hall, which contained the word "clocksucker." Id. The FCC said it "does not
restrict broadcasts ... unless the material involves a patently offensive depiction of sexual or
excretory activities .... The political broadcast at issue does not meet this test in our view."
Id.
*KING-TV Seattle: A husband and wife from Seattle complained about KING-TV's
broadcast on June 3, 1987, of a program entitled "Teen Sex, What About the Kids," based on
a sex-education course at an area high school. Id. The program included frank discussions of
sexual topics using models of sexual organs. Id. The FCC said such descriptions of sex were
not presented in a patently offensive manner, which would have required utilizing "lewd,"
"shocking" inferences. Id.
*WTRG-FM Rocky Mount, N.C.: A complaint was received regarding the June 3, 1987
broadcast of a song entitled "I Want to Kiss Her, But... " Id. at 38. The FCC explained that
the innuendo and double entendre in this song were not actionable because they did not
intermingle "explicit references" that allow only a sexual interpretation of the innuendo and
double entendre. Id. Thus, the lyrics were not susceptible to solely a sexual interpretation. Id.
"Rather," the FCC said, "the lyrics are capable of two meanings - one innocent, one sexual."
Id.
*WBAI-FM New York: A complaint about explicit references to sexual and excretory organs
was dismissed for lack of a tape recording or transcript of the program. Id.
303. Id. at 38-39.
304. Id.
305. Id. The pandering doctrine, revived from Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,
470 (1966), proves troublesome because it lacks objective criteria by which it can be
determined. On a subjective basis, almost anything can appear to be pandering to someone.
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morning program. 3°6 The question the FCC does not address is how
children will be injured by Stem's fleeting jokes more than they would
be by models of sexual organs. This question particularly becomes
important when one considers that a child of less than ten years old
arguably would be more affected by pictures of sexual organs on tele-
vision than the innuendo and double entendre found in Stem's show.
The FCC insists that it will proceed cautiously in enforcing its
new standard because of the difficulty of determining what is inde-
cent, and because each action sets precedent for further action.30 7
Instead of setting detailed guidelines, however, the FCC has allowed
the guidelines to evolve from its periodic actions that are clearing up
few questions.30 8 Thus, the context of a broadcast is supposed to be
the most concrete standard by which broadcasters can judge inde-
cency; however, such is not the case. The FCC never has explained
the role of the context of the broadcast in its relation to patent offen-
siveness. Furthermore, the FCC has refused to explain why otherwise
patently offensive material can become inoffensive simply by being
discussed in a "serious" context. Reading James Joyce's "Ulysses"
over the airwaves apparently is not indecent despite its portions of
patently offensive language.30 9 The critically acclaimed play "The
Jerker," however, does not rate the same consideration.310 Moreover,
the FCC has stated that serious merit is among many variables that
will be considered in determining patent offensiveness, but in the same
discussion, no mention is made of what other variables will be
considered.31
The sum of these abstract indecency standard problems makes it
unworkable, evidencing why it is impossible to regulate this area with
a generic standard without offending the first amendment. Moreover,
Mark Fowler, the recent chairman of the FCC, often emphasized
that, as nearly as possible, the print media should be the regulatory
model for the electronic media.31 2 Under Fowler, who left the FCC
306. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
307. See FCC rejects five indecency complaints, BROADCASTING, April 11, 1988 at 37-38
(The FCC rejected five indecency complaints against two television stations and three radio
stations.).
308. Id.
309. Indecency: Radio's sound, FCC's fury, BROADCASTING, June 22, 1987, at 48. The
FCC described "Ulysses" as a classic. Id. The FCC allowed the work to be read. Id. A radio
station manager described the new indecency standard as a "cloud" over contemporary
literature, and one that would encourage right-wing groups to challenge license renewal
applications. Id.
310. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
311. Id.
312. Fowler, supra note 8, at 455 (Supervision of children's viewing habits should be left to
parents so that government control can be relaxed.).
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four months before it announced the generic indecency standard, the
FCC had remarkable success in carrying out a deregulatory program
toward this goal. But apparently a shift in the personnel on the FCC
and political pressure served to alter the Commission's attitude
toward the free speech rights of broadcasters. 3
It becomes apparent that only a Miller-type standard, or one sim-
ilar to it, is the proper method of regulating the first amendment
rights of broadcasters. Unless broadcasters can weigh the merit of the
material it broadcasts as a whole, they always will be unsure of
whether a fleeting indecent statement may render a whole broadcast
capable of sanctions. Ultimately, it is difficult to square the first
amendment with the FCC's new standard for indecency and the D.C.
Circuit's treatment of the standard. The first amendment at a mini-
mum requires those who limit its protection to properly justify their
actions. Neither the D.C. Circuit nor the FCC have attempted to put
indecency within the framework of what purpose freedom of speech
serves and why the liberty is so important.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are four general approaches that the FCC can take to deal
with indecency in broadcasting. First, the FCC can ban indecent
material entirely, as it recently did at the insistence of Congress. Sec-
ond, the FCC can recognize that indecent material is protected under
the first amendment and thereby outside the FCC's purview of regula-
tion. Third, the FCC can recognize that indecent material is a class of
speech that can be channeled to the late evening and early morning
hours. And, finally, the FCC can offer technological advances as an
alternative to a total ban, e.g., a special class of license to broadcast
adults-only material, scrambled channels requiring a special receiver,
or lock-out mechanisms.
It is notable that in three of the four possible approaches, inde-
cency must be defined by a standard. Because of the inherent
problems in categorizing a type of speech that is so particularly linked
with personal preferences, it is difficult to make a general regulation in
this area. 4 The higher the degree of abstraction with which indecent
speech is defined, the more broadcasters are justified in demanding
that the court or the FCC specify what factors render a given word or
phrase indecent. Therefore, a more concrete principle or statement of
313. L. POWE, supra note 35, at 575.
314. See Note, Morality and Broadcasting: FCC Control of "Indecent" Material Following
Pacifica, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 145 (1978); Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First
Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV. 579 (1975).
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the rule is necessary to permit verification that the court, or FCC, has
placed the case in the proper category of indecency. Absent such a
mediating principle, the only way to criticize an indecency ruling is
simply to say that the ruling is no good, without being able to argue
why it is incorrect.
It is apparent from the inherent problems involved in defining
indecency that the FCC violates the first amendment by using such a
nebulous standard. At a minimum, indecency should receive as rigor-
ous a standard as that used to regulate obscenity. In Miller v. Califor-
nia,"' the Supreme Court's leading case on obscenity, the Court
appears to forbid such regulation unless it derives from specific
prohibitions that give fair notice to broadcasters of the sexual conduct
or excretory activities that they cannot portray. Since the generic
standard promulgated by the FCC does not provide concrete detail of
culpable conduct, it improperly chills the speech of broadcasters, who
will refrain from airing programming that is questionable but not
indecent-particularly because they are subject to license renewal.
Even if a channeling approach is followed, the FCC still must
specify the words or types of discussion that it deems indecent. Con-
clusory declarations of the "patent offensiveness" of certain material
effectively allows the FCC to be a roving censorship commission. The
FCC and its reviewing court should require a strong factual record to
show exactly how the parent's interest in protecting his children is
being damaged by what is aired.
JAY A. GAYOSO
315. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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